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A 
Introduction 
This study describes the legal creation of an Industry-^wide, tripartite 
collective bargaining structure in the private sector of the Chilean textile 
industry. The former structure limited collective bargaining to employers 
and employees within the confines of a single plant. The reform established 
a central bargaining organism where representatives of employers, employees 
and the government negotiated a single labor agreement for the nation's 
entire private sector. 
The new collective bargaining structure is set in a context of social, 
economic and political tensions that characterize the socialist experiment 
Chile has undertaken. The study seeks to show how these tensions emerge in 
the textile collective bargaining process; how they are resolved for purposes 
of reaching an agreement, but how they remain operant, perhaps even exacerbated 
as a result of such an agreement, in the overall process of change. 
The tensions will be discussed in terms of a conflict between the 
economic policy and the labor policy of the new Chilean government. The gist 
of the conflict is this: the success of the economic policy requires restraint 
on the wages of unionized, higher-paid workers, but the success of the labor 
policy requires that higher wages be paid to precisely that organized sector 
of the work force. It appears that the Chilean government is pursuing 
contradictory policies. In the economic sphere, it seeks to establish 
a dominant socialized sector with centralized planning and control. Implicit 
in such a controls program are wage controls. On the other hand, the 
government wants to retain the support of the organized workers by spurring 
the development of large, strong industry-wide unions that can obtain higher 
wages for their members through collective bargaining. 
This study examines how these conflicting policies clash in the new 
textile collective bargaining process. In doing so, the study follows two 
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major lines of inquiry. One discusses the technical problems of labor relations 
in the Chilean textile industry, hoping to illuminate the kind of difficulties 
faced by developing countries in their efforts to combine economic and labor 
policies for growth. The role of the state in the bargaining process, the 
identity of the negotiators and the interests they represent, the issues 
bargained about, the content of the collective agreement, the economic effects 
of the agreement, etc. are all matters of interest to those studying labor 
relations in developing countries. 
There is also a political line of inquiry, one which focuses on the 
social and political forces at work in the overall Chilean process and how 
they affect the textile bargaining. Students of Latin American political 
affairs, or anyone interested in an experiment in democratic socialism, may 
be helped by the treatment of issues like the restraints and accomodations 
of existing laws and institutions, rivalries among the political parties 
inside and outside the ruling coalition, contending interests within the 
working class and within the employer class, the relationship between the 
unions and the political parties, between organized and unorganized workers, 
etc. 
Three major sections comprise the study. The first sets out a historical 
and political framework for both overall events and for the labor relations 
system. The second concentrates on the technical aspects of the new system 
in the textile industry and the conflict between economic and labor policies. 
Finally, we shall step back for a recapitulation and a political analysis of 
that conflict, and attempt to calculate the future course of events. The 
latter effort, however, will be undertaken with the most extreme circumpsection, 
The only certain thing about Chile is that nothing is certain. Indeed, the 
true worth of this study may lie-- in expressing the confusion and complexity 
of the process taking place in new Chile. 
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1) Historical & Political Frameworks 
The starting point for this brief outline of social and political 
developments that led to the socialist victory in the 1970 elections is 
the formation of the Socialist Worker Party in 1912. Already, however, 
extensive agitation and organization had been going on among working class 
groups in Chile, especially in the northern nitrate mines. In one particularly 
bitter struggle in 1907, for example, two thousand striking miners, their 
wives and children were killed in a single day by army troops in the 
northern port city of Iquique. 
The formation of the Socialist Workers Party was led by Luis Emlio 
Recabarren. A figure of superhuman energy and exceptional organizing skills, 
Recabarren had almost single-handedly organized the entire working class 
movement in both Chile and Argentina. He pulled his followers out of the 
liberal-leaning Democratic Party to create the SWP. Their declaration of 
the reasons for splitting contain two clauses significant in light of further 
developments: 
....3. Because the Democratic Party has never occupied 
itself with organizing the workers for the defense of 
their economic interest, nor with the education of the 
people by means of conferences or newspapers. 
..,.6. Because the Party in its many conventions has 
refused to establish a program of workers' economic 
demands.1 
The SWP undertook a program of close collaboration with the Chilean 
Workers' Federation, the first national workers' organization, which was 
2 organized in 1911. In 1922 the Socialist Workers Party became the Chilean 
Communist Party and a member of the Third International, following a visit 
by Recabarren to the Soviet Union, to whom the Communist Party has remained 
staunchly loyal ever since. Until 1925 the partnership of the Communist Party 
and the Workers' Federation made progress. Recabarren and other party members 
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were elected deputies in areas where the Federation was active. In that year, 
however, following the reaction of the traditionally ruling landowners and 
foreign mining interests—mainly British—the crackdown came. Federation 
headquarters were shelled by the Army. Dozens of leaders were killed, and 
thousands jailed for "subversive activities." The Communist Party continued 
its efforts, but stripped of its organized working class base. 
Chile was rocked by political instability during the late 1920's, with 
frequent military intervention, then ravaged by the Depression, Nitrate 
became a practically useless product, and thousands of unemployed workers 
streamed to Santiago from the North. The Workers' Federation renewed its 
activities and its ties to the Communits Party in spite of continued government 
repression. In 1933, the Socialist Party of Chile was formed from various 
independent Marxist groups. With the Communist Party's adherence to the 1935 
order of the Third International to seek popular fronts against fascism, the 
Socialist Party occupied a position ideologically to the left of the Communists, 
which it has maintained to this day, 
Like the Communist Party, the Socialist Party sought to base its 
strength in the organized sector of the working class. Although it succeeded 
in obtaining widespread working class support during its rapid early growth, 
middle class intellectuals continued to play a dominant role. The Communist 
Party remained mainly a working class party, in its leadership as well as 
its base. Their competition for worker support, however (the Socialists 
organized a rival federation), gave rise to suspicion and hostility that 
was later disastrous. 
The labor movement's trade unionist activity, especially organizing 
and striking, was being constantly obstructed in the 1920's and 30's. On one 
hand, the legal restrictions of the 1925 Labor Code kept unions organizationally 
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weak and economically impotent.* On the other hand, varying degress of 
official violence were employed to break strikes and intimidate workers and 
union leaders, 
Labor was forced to seek protection in the political arena. Already 
an extensive social security program, minimum wage laws and other labor-interested 
legislative projects were underway, all of them handled by politically influenced 
administrative bodies, The presence of Communist and Socialist representatives 
in the legislature—a fairly steady 20-30%—was the chief weapon of the 
organized workers for obtaining these protections, Conversely, the electoral 
support of the workers was the chief guarantee of growth and preservation of 
the left political parties. Recabarren's recommendation to base the ties 
between the workers' parties and the workers on an economic program was 
carried out, but this program was elaborated almost exclusively in the legislative 
sphere. The flow of support went from the workers to their representatives in 
Congress rather than from the parties to the workers in their sindical struggles. 
In short, the legal method of self protection eclipsed the trade unionist method 
for the Chilean working class. 
The Socialist Party dropped its original opposition to a Popular Front 
(a proposal which it had previously characterized as "collaborationist") when 
it joined the electoral coalition which won the presidency in 1938. The 
Communist Party and the left wing of the Radical Party, the chief political 
party of the time-<-a liberal party based on the Masonic movement—were the 
other members of the coalition, The formation of the Popular Front spurred 
a merger between the rival Socialist and Communist labor federations, though 
they maintained their separate factions, 
ThexPppular Front government undertook important reforms in Chile's 
*See Ch, 2. 
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social and economic life. It encouraged union organization, weakened the 
grip of the traditional ruling sectors by increasing the role of the middle 
class, and originated a broad program of conscious state intervention in 
the economy, especially through the creation of CORK), the state Development 
Corporation. During the first two terms of the Popular Front, 1938-1946,* 
the tendency of organized labor and the left wing political parties to collaborate 
in the legislative and administrative (rather than trade unionist) process 
was reinforced. A national health service was instituted; a young Socialist 
doctor and deputy, Salvador Allende, was active in its creation and was for 
a time Minister of Health. Wage and price regulation was extended, The 
sueldo vital, a minimum wage for white-collar workers, was instituted. 
Organized labor representatives were appointed to state economic bodies, especially 
CORK), A climate of "social peace" replaced the open class struggle, Significantly, 
however, intentions to reform the Labor Code's restrictive measures were not 
realized, The government fell short of many of its other objectives as well. 
Jorge Barria, Chile's leading labor history and labor relations expert, 
concludes that 
Its connection with a political coalition distracted many 
energies from the CTCH [the Communist-Socialist workers' 
federation] in campaigns which, at bottom, only served 
the political objectives of the parties that oriented it, 
but which were not translated into permanent gains for 
the country's working class.3 
Both the climate of social peace and the uneasy truce between the 
Communist and Socialist parties were broken in 1946, A workers' demonstration 
was broken up by police, resulting in five workers' deaths, A general strike 
was the response, but disagreement over whether to continue it led to a 
*The Communist and Socialist parties pulled out of the coalition in 1941 on 
ideological principles, but remained a "loyal opposition," 
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Socialist-Communist split. The conflict deteriorated to such a fratricidal 
point that they even broke each other's strikes. There are veterans of the 
labor movement who even now refuse to speak to each other, despite their 
current collaboration in the Popular Unity government, as a result of that 
clash. 
A Popular Front candidate^Gabriel Bonzalez Videla, won the presidency 
in 1946. It was not long, however, before he established his reputation among 
the Left as "the traitor." In 1948, his administration put the Communist 
Party outside the law through the "Law for the Defense of Democracy," soon 
baptized by the Left as the "ley maldita" (accursed law). This law gave the 
executive power to detail anyone engaged in "subversive activities", and 
was used to repress the non-Communist left as well as the Communists. The 
law's chief victims were militant labor leaders. Contrary to the hopes of 
the government, however, the cambativeness of the working class increased 
rather than diminished. Despite its internal divisions, the jailing of its 
leaders, and the illegality of its principal political party, Chilean workers 
multiplied their strikes, demonstrations and organizing activity. The 
Communist Party continued to act clandestinely, and emerged stronger from 
the ten year's duration of the "ley maldita" than before. 
The 1952 presidential elections saw a substantial victory for Carlos 
Ibanez, a retired army general who had been a major figure in the upheavals 
of the 1920's. He won on a populist-tinged platform, with some Socialist 
support. In a poor 4th position, with 5.5% of the vote, came Salvador Allende, 
candidate of another Socialist faction (Communists were not allowed to vote). 
Ibanez's government soon developed into another conservative regime, but in 
1953 a new force of paramount importance entered the scene: the formation 
of the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT),* a new national trade union 
*pronounced koot 
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federation. Communists and Socialists subordinated their rivalry to common 
interests, and together with representatives of all other ideological positions 
and all sectors of the working class—blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, 
public employees, professionals—they unified the fragmented union movement 
into a strong, politically active federation. The CUT grouped about one-
fourth of the nation's workers, most of those organized in unions. The first 
CUT election resulted in Communist and Socialist dominance, a tendency that 
has maintained itself ever since. 
The CUT came under severe repression in 1956. Labor leaders again 
filled prison camps in the isolated North, but again the bases responded 
firmly. The CUT and the left-wing parties, including the Communists acting 
clandestinely, organized the Popular Action Front (FRAP—Frente de Accion 
Popular) to resist the growing reaction. This coalition almost elected 
Salvador Allende in the 1958 elections. The candidate of the Right, Jorge 
Alessandri, won with 31.6% of the vote. Allende followed with 29.9%, with 
Eduardo Frei, candidate of the rapidly growing Christian Democratic Party, 
getting 20.7%. A fourth candidate, a Radical, obtained 15.6%. Most Chileans 
agree that Allende would have won were it not for a doomed fifth candidacy, 
of a left-wing priest who drew off 5% of the progressive votes. 
The Alessandri period was characterized by its anti-inflationary 
measures, which sought to restrain worker's real wages. The CUT and the 
FRAP parties, especially the Socialists and the Communist Party (legal again 
since the end of the Ibanez regime), fought bitterly against this program, 
demanding wage increases equal to the rise of the cost of living.* Though 
they were unable to halt the anti-inflation program (which failed—inflation 
*See discussion of the reajuste, pp. 
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continued its dizzy rise), their opposition garnered more rank-and-file support 
for the parties of the FRAP. In the 1964 elections, Salvador Allende's 
vote grew to 39%. Fearing an Allende victory, however, the Right's candidate 
withdrew and threw support to Eduardo Frei. Frei won with 56% of the vote, 
to Allende's 39%. 
The Frei regime began with broad support and high hopes, even among 
working class sectors that had supported the FRAP. They hoped that the 
Christian Democrats would live up to their reformist rhetoric. The honeymoon 
was short-lived. In his second year of government, Frei dispatched army 
troops to the scene of a copper strike at El Salvador mine, which ended 
with eight killed and over forty wounded in the subsequent massacre. The CUT 
responded with a general strike. Later steps of the Frei government, including 
a forced-savings plan and anti-inflationary measures like those of Alessandri, 
were also bitterly fought by the CUT and the left wing parties. Within the 
Christian Democratic Party itself, youth leadership became increasingly 
disillusioned with Frel's performance. In 1968, most of the progressive 
Christian Democratic youth split from the Party to form the United Popular 
Action Movement (MAPU—Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitaria). 
During the Frei regime the Communist Party had been militating for a 
shift in the Left's strategy, away from an exclusively working class party 
front (the FRAP) toward a new popular front with progressive sectors of the 
Communist and Socialist parties, 
middle class. Its reasoning was accepted. In late 1969, the /\ 
together with MAPU—still basically a party of radicalized Christian Democrats, 
but moving leftward ideologically and finding an enthusiastic response among 
young workers—and the left wing of the middle class Radical Party, formed 
the Popular Unity coalition (UP—Unidad Popular) to confront the 1970 
presidential elections. 
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The UP formulated a program of radical reform that would create the 
conditions for a transition to socialism while respecting Chile's institutional 
constitutional framework and/safeguards. The program emphasized an alliance of workers, 
peasants and the middle class against the traditional landed and industrial 
oligarchy, It called for "the transfer of power from the old dominant 
groups to the workers, the peasants and the progressive sectors of the 
middle classes of the city and the countryside," 
Most of the UP program could be characterized as ultra-reformist; 
that is, it encompassed the kinds of reforms typical of social democratic 
governments that accept the rules of a constitutional order. In one key 
respect, though, the UP distinguished itself from other elected reformist 
governments; it promised to socialize the largest and most productive 
manufacturing companies, not just service sector losers like railroads and 
utilities. The core of the UP's concrete proposals was the establishment 
of the Social Property Area (Area Social), nationalized activities which 
would include natural resources, banks and the major manufacturing enterprises. 
A list of 91 companies was issued, which were the targets for full or 
partial nationalization under the UP's economic program. These 91 companies, 
out of the more than 35,000 business establishments in Chile, produced 60% 
of the country's GNP. 
Radomiro Tomic, The Christian Democrats in the 1970 elections, presented 
a program similar in almost every respect to that of the UP. Memories of 
Frei's promises, however, eroded his credibility. The third candidate was 
ex-president Jorge Alessandri, running on an openly authoritarian, anti-
working class platform. The election shaped up, therefore, as a three-way 
context among two progressive candidacies, one based in the working class 
and built on decades of opposition; one based in the liberal middle class 
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but weighted by the failure of its predecessor; and one reactionary candidacy. 
The CUT had always maintained a position of formal neutrality with 
respect to political parties. It continued this tradition in this election, 
but it did everything short of issuing official declarations to further 
the candidacy of Salvador Allende, once again the choice of the Chilean 
Left. The working class parties, so often on the defensive, now had the 
opportunity to win the executive power. Organized labor was not going to 
vacilate in its support. Their efforts succeeded; Allende won with 36.2% 
of the vote, narrowly ahead of Alessandri with 34.9%. Tomic was a poor 
third, with 27.8%. Conservative forces had won in 1958; liberals had 
their chance in 1964. Now it was the socialists' turn. 
Allende's 36.3% of the vote was drawn from three major sectors of 
the population: male blue-collar workers; that portion' °f t n e middle class 
still loyal to the Radical Party (a member of the UP coalition); and 
socialist-leaning women, peasants, sutdents, white-collar and professional 
workers and various other social groupings. The conservative candidate's 
nearly equal votation came from the upper class; that portion
 0f the middle 
class with reactionary tendencies, especially the lower middle class upset 
by the labor militancy of the late 60's; and from reactionary women, students, 
white collar and professional workers, etc. (not peasants). The Christian 
Democrats drew most of their support from peasants, the remainder of the 
middle class, working class women and from a solid minority block of 
adherents among blue^collar workers. 
The UP was a minority government, but it was hardly impotent. The 
extensive power and initiative that goes to the executive in a presidential 
state had been won by the Left. The Opposition controlled a majority in the 
Congress;not, however, the two-thirds majority needed to override a presidential 
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veto. The struggle for socialism became, therefore, a constitutional struggle 
between the executive and legislative powers. The President sought to employ 
his legally authorized powers to further the UP program, while the Opposition 
sought to block him through legislative action. 
As we shall see, Congress was unable to prevent the implementation 
of much of the UP program. Legitimate executive authority to put private 
companies under state control was quickly utilized to create a socialist 
sector of the economy. Nonetheless, the UP was operating under several 
important political constraints during this early stage. The Opposition 
united itself, and was planning to run single candidate against the UP in 
the congressional elections of March, 1973. If the Opposition managed to 
secure more than a two-thirds majority, it would seize the initiative from 
President Allende because it could then overrule a presidential veto. 
If the UP won more than one-half the seats, on the other hand, it could 
then implement its program through legislation, with the full force of the 
legislative power behind the executive. But the latter event was considered 
unlikely. To get one-half, the UP had to win over 14% of the Opposition's 
64% votation in the 1970 election. A loss of only 3% of its own 1970 vote 
gave the Opposition a two-thirds majority. The important thing for the UP, 
therefore, was to hold on to each of its sources of voting strength so as 
not to risk the 3% loss. 
Retaining its one-third congressional respresentation required the UP 
to deal with its own internal differences. The Communist Party still scared 
many people with its adherence to the Moscow line, despite the fact that, 
in term of issues, it was the most conservative member of the UP coalition. 
It urged a slow, step-by-step reform process rather than precipitous socialization 
and strongly attacked "ultra-left" elements that tried to push; the process. 
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In contrast to the disciplined, single-minded Communists, the Socialist 
Party was all over the political map. Its right wing, identified with 
President Allende, was close to the Communist position on most matters. 
The left wing of the Socialist Party, however, developed close ties with 
the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) and other "ultra-left" groups excoriated 
by the Communists. The Radical Party, meanwhile, tried to maintain its 
progressive tradition by staking out a position to the left of the Communists, 
and at the same time preserve its middle class support that was so crucial 
to the UP's electoral strategy. These and other disparate political tendencies 
had to be brought together in a single program of action that would not 
jeopardize continued support from any one of the various groups that 
contributed to the UP's narrow 1970 victory. 
The long march of the Chilean workers that began with Recabarren in 
the early part of the century had now completed the first leg of its journey, 
when Salvador Allende entered the Presidential Palace in November, 1970. 
This outline has attempted to summarize the main conditions of the journey: 
debilitation of organized labor's sindical strength, by legal restraints and 
by outright repression; the consequent necessity to align with political 
parties in order to defend the workers' economic interests through legislative 
activity; the socialist ideals of the principal working class parties; the 
mutual interdependence of organized labor and the socialist parties, one 
in the interest of defending their living standards, the other in the 
interest of defending their survival as a political force; finally, the 
general balance of political forces at the time the UP came to power. 
We shall next proceed to examine the first of these conditions, and in 
many ways a key to the rest: the legal restraints on union organization 
and activity. 
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2) Traditional Collective Bargaining 
In order to appreciate the changes occuring in Chilean labor relations 
under the Popular Unity government, we are going to take a rather extensive 
look at the traditional labor relations system. The first part of this 
description will treat the legal structure of union organization and activity. 
The second will deal with the legal structure of collective bargaining. 
The final part will discuss how the collective bargaining system operates in 
practice—the degrees to which it conforms and contrast to the formal legal 
structures.* 
A. The Legal Structure of Union Organization and Activity 
Like every facet of labor relations in Chile, union organization and 
activity have been strictly regulated by the voluminous 1924 Labor Code and 
its supplementary legislation. Hailed in its time as a model of modern labor 
law, the Code reflects then-progressive notions that have been rendered old-
fashioned by developments since then. Because legislators believed that 
workers in small enterprises were under the personal care of their employers, 
union organization was limited to firms of twenty-five or more employees, 
Still in effect, this requirement has kept well over one-fourth the manufacturing 
labor force from even being able to form unions. Furthermore, since economic 
activity was perceived in 1924 as the work of an individual entrepreneur 
operating in a free market, the Code limited union organization to the 
confines of a single plant in order to avoid the trade-restraining effects of 
*Due to the „fact that many features of the traditional collective bargaining 
process are still operative while others have been neutralized, reformed or 
eliminated by events since the change of government in 1970, this opening 
section presents a problem of how to arrange verb tenses in a consistent 
way. It is resolved by writing from the standpoint of 1970, using the 
present tense to describe the situation on the eve of the Allende government's 
arrival to power in November, 1970, 
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multi-firm organization. All unions are "company unions," though not in 
the perforative sense the phrase carried in English, and bear their company's 
name. Industry-wide organization is prohibited, and all the economic leverage 
it would furnish is lost to the workers, Federations may and have been 
% formed, but only for educational, welfare or other cooperative purposes. 
1
 They may not bargain or otherwise directly represent union interests in 
conflicts with management. 
Finally, because it was felt at the time that there was such a 
difference between blue-collar and white-collar work that they needed 
different treatment, the Code divided workers into two classifications: 
obreros (blue collar) and empleados (white collar). Each was required to 
form a separate union, even inside the same plant. Upon this distinction 
a whole panoply of laws and institutions have been build up, most of which 
give decided advantages to empleados. Empleado status is granted by the 
legislature, and there is stiff competition among obreros to obtain it, 
Steam shovel and dredger operators were recently elevated to empleado status, 
'..for example, setting off a wave of protest and demands from other machine 
f\ operators. The Labor Code, therefore, not only divides the union movement 
into a firm-by-firm structure. It divides it into different unions within a 
-, firm, and also creates rivalries among workers in similar occupations. 
The Code also fashioned a trap-ridden procedural maze for all facets 
of union activity—organizing the union, electing officers, spending union 
i. funds, setting, bargaining and ratifying demands and agreements, etc. These 
and all other activities are regulated in step-by-step detail, and any 
% failure to comply means the whole effort is lost, An immediate result of 
this has been to discourage many workers from even trying to form a union, 
Furthermore; many of the Code's provisions were openly designed to 
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limit union effectiveness. It forbade the formation of professional union 
leadership by requiring all union officers to work full-time in the plant. 
It barred union negotiators from access to employers' records, prohibited 
the creation of a union strike fund, and required government approval for 
all expenditure of union funds. 
On the opposite side, the legal structure of union organization 
has allowed the Chilean labor movement to avoid entirely the union-shop 
and dual unionism controversies that plague many other labor movements. 
If 55% or more of the obreros in a plant vote to constitute a union, everyone 
is in it and everyone pays dues. As pointed out above, that is the union; 
there are no rival organizations seeking to capture its members. Where 
a union is organized, furthermore, the Code requirements of full rank-and-file 
participation in the election of union officers, in the formation of 
bargaining demands, and in the ratification of an agreement, make for a 
Q 
certain degree of responsiveness and accountability of union officers. 
Finally, like many aged codes, problems of enforcement, desuetude, 
disregard, etc. mitigate some of its stringency. Union officers spend a 
good deal of their time on union activity, often with employers' blessings. 
The no-strike-fund clause is just winked at. Dues paid for picnics, 
recreation, culture and so forth go for strike benefits. This is also one 
situation where inter-union aid is extended. Members of other unions still 
working tax themselves to help the companeros on strike. 
These breaches are confined to union activity, however. The structure 
of union organization, which divides the union movement into thousands of 
plant-wide unions, has been generally enforced. With the limitations described 
above, there are only A,000 unions in Chile in 1970 (out of 35,000 business 
enterprises) with 437,000 members—less than one-fifth the non-agricultural 
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labor force. Only 1,500 of the unions and 200,000 of the union members are 
9 
blue-collar workers. 
B. The Legal Structure of Collective Bargaining 
The collective bargaining system is carefully structured and its 
process minutely regulated by the Labor Code. In accordance with the 
structure of union organization, traditional collective bargaining takes 
place in the setting of the individual plant. There is no multi-union or 
multi-employer bargaining. An important point with regard to the bargaining 
structure, however, is that the Code opens the process to workers in all 
firms. Union organization of a firm is not necessary. Neither is 
bargaining itself necessary. Workers may, where there is no union, continue 
to deal individually with their employer. 
Where workers do bargain collectively with their employer, they must 
first assemble and formulate a set of demands, called the pliego de peticlones, 
or simply pliego. The pliego must be ratified by signatures of a majority 
of at least two-thirds of the workers. These demands are presented to the 
employer by the union officers or the Comite de Pliego.where there is no 
union. 
If the employer were to concur at his point, the process would end 
here. He never does, however, since the demands are always far greater than 
what the final accord will possibly be. His refusal creates a juridically-
defined situation of conflicto colectivo; that is, the legal recognition 
that there is a collective dispute. The Code allows the parties fifteen 
days to negotiate an agreementddlrectly. This period is filled with required 
meetings, deadlines, papers to be filed, etc. 
A continued deadlock moves the bargaining process to the stage of 
conciliacion (better translated in English as "mediation"). The parties bring 
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their conflict to the Junta de Conciliacion, a third party Mediation Board 
of neutral employer, employee and Ministry of Labor representatives. A 
detailed process of hearings, proposals and counter-proposals before the 
Mediation Board ensues. If no agreement is reached within fifteen days, the 
Board offers its own solution. The parties can accept that offer, or go to 
binding arbitration (which they never do), or to economic battle—the strike 
and the lock-out. Though an agreement need not be ratified by the rank-and-
file, a strike decision must be approved by a majority of two-thirds of the 
workers in secret voting. All of these procedures—and this is just a 
broad outline, each step being regulated in the minutest detail by the Code— 
must be strictly adhered to. Failure to do so means the parties should start 
again at zero, and any subsequent strike activity is formally illegal. 
The agreement finally achieved by the workers and their employer, 
whether reached in direct negotiations, through the Mediation Board, or 
following a strike or lock-out, is known as an acta de avenimiento or "act 
of accord." This agreement does not have the status of a contract. It is 
not enforceable either in court or through the Ministry of Labor. It is 
rather an expression of the intentions of the parties, and depends on their 
mutual good will for observance. At any time, one of the parties may 
break the agreement or decide to provoke a new conflicto by demanding changes 
in the agreement. 
C. The Practice of Collective Bargaining 
1. The Reajuste 
Any discussion of the substance of collective bargaining in Chile 
must begin with an explanation of the reajuste ("readjustment"). One has 
to first consider Chile's intractable inflation (18% in the 1940's, 36% in the 
1950's and 25% in the 1960's) and imagine the inflationary psychology that goes 
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with it. Wage agreements, both individual and collective, are set for one 
year's duration. During the year, however, prices are constantly rising. 
The buying power possessed during the early months of the agreement dwindles 
until, by its end, only the barest essential can be bought. 
This is where the reajuste takes on its paramount importance in 
Chilean public affairs. The reajuste is the legislative declaration of 
the amount workers' wages are to be raised in order to restore their 
purchasing power. It is given as a percentage, and is determined in relation 
to the National Statistics Institute's index for price rises of certain 
essential consumer goods. The reajuste does not, however, automatically 
equal the percentage rise in cost of living. It can be higher or lower, 
and the lumbering legislative march toward the final figure fixes all Chile 
in a grip of suspense. 
Usually declared at the beginning of every year, the reajuste represents 
the mandatory wage hike for public employees and workers with individual 
contracts. It is not mandatory for employees with a collective bargaining 
agreement. Past governments sought to fight inflation by setting a reajuste 
below the price index figure; that is, by holding the wages of public and 
unorganized workers below the increase in the cost of living. These are 
the workers who have lost, as a result of these below-cost reajustes (especially 
during the conservative government of 1958-1964, but also at times during the 
1964-1970 Christian Democratic government), in the struggle with inflation. 
Unionized workers, on the other hand, have generally been able to 
keep pace with the cost of living rise. They bargain on the basis of the 
price index figure, not the reajuste. Their bargaining is spread throughout 
the year, in a plant-by-plant pattern, and the workers in each individual 
plant use the price index figure of the previous twelve-month period as the 
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guide to their wage demands. If workers In plant A bargain in March, for 
example, and the price rise index shows an increase of 28% from the previous 
March, that figure is the basis for negoitations with the employer. If 
those in plant B bargain in October and the twelve-month index shows a 
16% rise, they bargain around that figure. In other words, workers who 
bargain collectively are usually able to recuperate the buying power lost 
over the previous twelve months. Public employees and workers with individual 
contract, on the other hand, are liable to get a reajuste of 15% when the 
previous year's inflation reached 33% (as happened in 1960). 
2. Setting Demands 
Most workers formulate bargaining demands far in excess of what 
could possibly be obtained, or even realistically discussed. Many pllegos 
ask a wage hike two or three times greater than the previous twelve months' 
cost of living rise. This is due largely to the Code-required method of 
drawing up the pliego. Rather than set by union officers and economic 
advisors on the basis of concrete data, demands are prepared in an open 
meeting of all the workers of a plant. If the plant has one thousand 
workers, it is a meeting of one thousand men and women. Whether a thousand 
workers or ten, in such a setting detailed presentations of productivity or 
profit data carry little weight compared to impassioned exhortations about 
how much they should wrest from the boss. Moderation is weakness, so that 
union officers or comite members take the lead in militance. In the actual 
negotiations they can deal in a businesslike manner with the employer. 
Still, it is the price index figure that serves as the basis for wage 
negotiation, not productivity or profit figures. 
3. Subjects of Bargaining 
The first subject dealt with in collective bargaining is usually the 
basic wage increase. Most of the discussion centers around considerations 
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of a "fair" increase in relation to the cost of living rise, rather than" 
conventional market criteria. The price index serves as a guideline for 
this issue. Obtaining an increase higher than the index is the union 
officers' goal; with this they can assert that they are improving their 
members' position. Most agreements do end up slightly above the index 
figure. 
The most tenacious negotiation centers on fringe benefits. Much 
in the way of such benefits is regulated by the Labor Code and social 
security laws—overtime hours, overtime pay, vacation days, sick pay, 
pensions, even day-care centers inside each plant with more than twenty 
workers. This is the area where the workers' parties in the legislature 
play an important role, and social security laws (which affect the entire 
range of welfare problems, not just old age) make employers' payments into 
welfare funds a staggering one-fourth of their labor costs. An impressive 
array of further benefits are arranged, however, through collective bargaining. 
These range from relatively standard items like holiday bonuses, birth, 
marriage and death-in-the-family bonuses, extra payments for having children 
in school, severance pay and profit-sharing plans,* to singular items which 
include (from a survey of many agreements): milk for lunch, shoes for 
the children, Christmas toys, two hour grace periods for the arrival of 
mothers on rainy days, paid practice time for the firm's futbol team, payment 
to the union to celebrate May 1 and a bonus for ending a strike. 
Such fringe benefits add greatly to employers' administrative burdens, 
and most prefer to pay a straight wage and leave the rest to the workers' 
discretion. Most of these benefits, however, contain a certain "to each 
*The Labor Code requires that 10% of each year's profits be shared among a 
firms' workers. Most unions, .however, prefer to negotiate a fixed sum— 
usually 3% of a year's wage—in lieu of the profit sharing, so as not to 
be left empty-handed in a profitless year or fall victim to their employer's 
book-juggling. 
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according to his needs" effect that the workers perceive as vitally important 
for their interests. For union officers, furthermore, winning an extra 
beneficio enhances their standing with the members. Pliegos are full of 
these kinds of demands, therefore; usually, as in the case of wages, far 
beyond what could conceivably be obtained. 
4. Content of Agreements 
A survey of Chilean collective bargaining agreements shows a nearly 
direct correlation between the size of a firm and the length and complexity 
of its agreement. A small firm of ten or fifteen workers, for example—and 
even small unionized firms (recall the twenty-five employee requirement for 
a union)—will have an agreement with a handful of clauses—the percentage 
wage rise and a few basic fringes. It is not unusual in these cases to see 
each worker named in the agreement with his or her wage, or to see one 
worker singled out for a higher wage "due to his being responsible for his 
deceased brother's family", for example. As firms grow larger, however, 
their unions usually negotiate a longer list of benefits, and detailed wage 
scales begin to emerge. One often sees, in these cases, a movement to 
establish escalated wage terms, so that lower-paid workers receive a larger 
percentage increase than the better-paid. In general, there appears to be 
rather narrow differentials between the wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers within a single firm, though there are sharp differences among 
workers in different firms who perform the same tasks. 
5. Chilean Management 
The collective bargaining process is strongly influenced by the nature 
of management in Chile. Most business enterprises are individually or 
family-owned,or operated. This gives the bargaining a highly personal 
character. Rather than dealing with a faceless organization man who is as 
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much an employee as they are, the workers usually bargain with the owner,1 
himself. Quite often, the owner's image corresponds to that of the 
grasping capitalist, at least in the workers' perception. Stripped of its 
bureaucratic trimmings, collective bargaining is reduced to its most 
elemental purpose: getting more money out of the pulpo ("octopus"--a common 
term of a greedy boss—used mainly during the negotiation period). 
At the same time, the personal character of bargaining lends a 
"human relations" quality to the dealings between management and labor. 
Union officers and company owners usually come to establish a working 
relationship which, for example, allows an officer to negotiate a loan or 
an advance in pay for a worker who needs money quickly, or to persuade 
the owner to carry a worker going through an unstable period due to personal 
problems. 
6. Non-existence of Agreement Administration 
A notable feature of traditional collective bargaining in Chile is 
the complete absence of administration of agreements by the bargaining 
parties. There is no grievance mechanism negotiated anywhere, even in the 
otherwise most detailed and sophisticated agreement. Grievances have been 
relegated by the Labor Code and its supplementary legislation to the 
Labor Courts and the Inspectorate of Labor (the local branches of the Ministry) 
The delays, the red tape and the costs this entails prevent many grievants 
from seeking any redress. 
In plants where the union is strong, on the other hand, officers 
can usually take care of grievance matters. This, in fact, is what 
occupies most of their time spent in violation of the Code's requirement 
to work full-time. But there is no regular procedure. Grievances are 
settled ad hoc, and only where the union has enough muscle to make the 
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employer bend—it will strike to back up a grievance. Workers in weak or 
non-union plants, however, are left to the maze of the courts or the 
Inspectorate. 
7. Legal and Illegal Strikes 
The Labor Code's detailed prescription for each step in the collective 
bargaining process has little practical significance. Failure to fully 
comply with the Code's provisions means that a subsequent strike is officially 
illegal. But so casually are these provisions observed that in 1970, for 
example, out of 1,819 total strikes, 1,601—88%—were officially illegal for 
13 failure to adhere to Code requirements. 
The supposed sanction against an illegal strike is that workers lose 
the dubious protection of a poorly-enforced law against arbitrary firing. 
Formally, that is, the employer is free to dismiss his striking employees 
and hire replacements whereas with a legal strike he could not. But 
employers generally will not fire workers even in an illegal strike. Firing 
of leaders usually stiffens the resolve of the rest. Mass firing will 
not work because Chilean workers will not cross a picket line, even a line 
of discharged employees. The employer simply could not get replacements. 
Scabbing is one problem a century of tough trade-union struggles has removed. 
8. The Bargaining Forum 
As in the case of legal and illegal strikes, there is a large gap 
between the Labor Code's prescribed bargaining forum and where bargaining 
actually takes place. For the thousands of conflictos registered with the 
Mediation Boards each year, only a tiny portion are actually settled by the 
Boards. In place of this rigid, deadline and red tape-ridden procedure 
there has grown up an entire system of mediation in informal fora. 
Most of the informal mediation is centered in the Inspectorate of Labor, 
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the local branches of the Ministry. Their legally-assigned role is to 
simply oversee the bargaining process and make sure that the Code's provisions 
are complied with, but their close contact with local plants transforms them 
into a useful forum for bargaining mediation. 
The Directorate of Labor, the next level up the bureaucracy from the 
Inspectorate, entertains weightier collective bargaining parties—large-sized 
plants for plants in key industries (a 1967 reform established an official 
mediation service in the Directorate to handle these disputes, as the 
ineffectiveness of the Mediation Boards became evident).. Conflicts of national 
import, like copper strikes, skip these intermediate stages and go straight 
to the Ministry for settlement. One could judge the relative size or 
importance of a firm or union, in fact, simply by knowing where its labor 
dispute was settled. The average size of firms (and therefore unions) who 
settled their differences in the local Inspectorates in 1970 was forty-six 
workers. Those who went to the Directorate averaged slightly over one 
hundred, while those going to the Ministry of Labor had over one thousand 
employees. 
^qptfytBBg tf^elfi^V^-, * 
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*Collective Bargaining Fora 
1968-1971 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
Number of 
labor disputes 
3,181 
3,156 
3,508 
5,282 
-# Unions 
3,424 
3,788 
4,006 
4,478 
Director-
ate of 
Labor 
286 
(9%) 
536 
(17%) 
540 
(15%) 
593 
(11%) 
Mediation 
Boards 
254 
(8%) 
** 
46 
(1%) 
54 
(1%) 
Informal 
mediation 
700 
(22%) 
** 
740 
(21%) 
1,061 
(20%) 
Between 
parties 
without 
strikes 
1,054 
(33%) 
** 
846 
(24%) 
1,152 
(22%) 
Between 
parties 
with 
strikes 
823 (est) 
(26%) 
977 
(31%) 
1,303 
(37%) 
2,339 
(45%) 
Other 1 
64 1 
(2%) 1 
** 
33 
(1%) 
83 
(1%) 
**Figures unavailable 
Source: Memoria Anual de la Direccion del Trabajo, 1968-1971 
^Includes settlements mediated by local Inspectorates, local mayors and governors, the Ministry and Subsecretariat 
of Labor, and even in some cases, the Ministry of the Interior or the President of the Republic, 
.J 
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3) Pressure for Change and the Christian Democratic Proposal 
The traditional structure and process of collective bargaining came 
under increasingly heavy criticism during the 1960's, both from unions and 
employers' groups as well as from academicians. The confinement of labor 
relations to the bounds of a single plant had a serious weakening effect on 
the economic strength of the labor movement. Since at any one time most 
firms in a particular industry would continue working while one or two 
were on strike, workers in the struck firms lost any secondary effects their 
action might have became their employer's suppliers and buyers could easily 
switch to one of the other firms still working. 
Fragmented into thousands of economic units, unions tended to identify 
with their own plant rather than with other unions in their industry, which 
they viewed as separate, sometimes even rival organizations. There were 
union federations in most industries, but they were political rather than 
economic bodies. They rarely embraced a majority of workers in an industry, 
were usually a project of one of the political parties and joined together 
unions oriented toward that party. 
There was also the CUT, the national trade union federation. The 
heavy role of the State in labor affairs—the fixing of the reajuste, the 
elevation to empleado status, the myriad social welfare measures, for example-
spurred the unions to exercise broad-based political power through their 
national federation. The three major forces in the CUT were the Communist, 
Socialist and Christian Democratic parties.* 
*Despite repeated efforts to divide the labor movement along ideological lines 
as in Western Europe by fomenting dual unionism, especially under the Frei 
government (1964-1970), Chilean workers have successfully kept themselves 
a united force. All political views are open to debate in the CUT, Election 
of union and of national officers is by universal and secret balloting, not 
by dubiously selected delegates to some convention in a resort city, as in 
the U.S. See CUT election results, note jj • 
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The representatives of these parties promoted legislation sought by 
the workers and unions and the latter responded with electoral support. 
Combined with the structural fragmentation imposed by the Labor Code, the 
political rather than sindical nature of union solidarity traditionally made 
for an absence of industrial union consciousness. Reliance for defense of 
workers1 interests was instead on the individual union, in its confrontation 
with the owner-boss in a single plant, and on the political parties allied 
with the working class through the CUT. 
CUT leaders were well aware of the economic weakness that resulted 
from the plant-by-plant bargaining structure, and formulated calls for reform 
of the Labor Code to permit industry-wide collective bargaining. In the 1952 
Comision Nacional de Unidad Sindical which- organized the CUT, the "Platform 
of Struggle" included the "creation of Industry-wide national commissions 
for the study and application of wage rates and collective bargaining contracts. 
Subsequent CUT congresses invariably included similar appeals, such as the 
1965 Platform of Struggle which called for "replacement of the current 
Conciliation Boards with national tripartite wage commissions by branch 
of industry." 
Labor relations scholars also attacked the firm-by-firm structure 
of union organization and collective bargaining. Professor Jorge Barria, 
Chile's leading authority in labor affairs, argued that such a structure 
"hindered the establishment of industry-wide contracts, which could be an 
important element in the remodeling of the system of existing industrial 
relations into another system more modern, efficient and democratic." 
Economist Victor Valdes pointed out the bargaining structure's contribution 
to inflation and its failure to consider rational factors like productivity 
in determining wage. 
Both Barria and Valdes had in mind alternative bargaining structures 
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drawn from exceptional situations in two industries: the leather and shoe 
industry, and the copper industry. The "modern, efficient and democratic" 
labor relations system recommended by Barria had already grown up, entirely 
contrary to the Labor Code's requirements, in the leather and shoe industry. 
In contrast to the bulk of the union movement, which was directed by 
Communist and Socialist activists, the leather and shoe workers' unions were 
dominated by anarchists. They preferred facing their employers directly 
rather than seeking legislative aid through the political parties. The 
result, though it took a half-century of struggle and suffering, was a 
bargaining structure unique in Chile and indistinguishable from the most 
sophisticated bargaining systems of advanced capitalist countries. It 
included an industry-wide base contract negoitated by democratically-elected 
officers of the national federation of leather and shoe industry unions (still 
formally organized by plant), who bargain privately with an organized and 
progressive-minded employers' association; a welfare and retirement fund 
administrated jointly by unions and employers and a comprehensive, standardized 
grievance settlement procedure. Such an advanced bargaining system, in 
brazen violation of the labor laws throughout the time it arose, was a 
good example of how rigid, outdated legislation can be overcome be determined 
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de facto efforts. 
In contrast to the privately-arranged bargaining structure of the 
leather and shoe industry, the bargaining structure of the copper industry 
was a product of special legislation for copper unions only. A 1966 law 
encouraged the development of full-time copper union leadership and removed 
much of the Directorate of Labor's monitoring of union affairs and control 
of union funds. It opened up channels of communication among the unions and 
strengthened the Confederation of Copper Workers. Although still barring 
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multi-employer bargaining, it brought about a relative uniformity of contract 
among copper unions and reduced rivalry among them. It permitted bargaining 
about subjects forbidden by the Code—social welfare payments,rpensions, 
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management prerogatives, etc. 
The tripartite thesis of the CUT prevailed when the first steps to 
reform the bargaining structure were taken. At the end of 1968, the Christian 
Democratic Frei government passed the following law: 
The President of the Republic is empowered to create 
Tripartite Commissions composed of representatives of 
Confederations, Federations, or, in the absence of these, 
Unions of workers; representatives of employers' organiza-
tions, and representatives of the Government; with the 
purpose of fixing minimum wages and conditions of work 
by branch of industrial activity, and regulating their 
establishment and functioning, 
Furthermore, said commissions shall be able to 
fix, by unanimity of their members, maximum wages and 
conditions of work common to the entire branch of 
activity. 
The resolutions of the Tripartite Commissions as 
to matters indicated in the foregoing paragraphs shall be 
obligatory for the employers. 
Violations shall be punished in accordance with 
article 5° ofothe present law.2° 
This reform on its face constituted a potentially drastic change in labor 
relations. The traditional firm-by-firm bargaining structure of an industry 
would be replaced with a nation-wide bargaining system and a single contract 
that covered non-union as well as union workers. Nonetheless, the reform 
passed virtually unnoticed by unions and employers alike. It was buried along 
with several other reforms in the 1968 reajuste law, and everyone's attention 
was riveted to the struggle for the highest possible percentage wage rise. 
Furthermore, it had been drafted without consulting labor or management 
groups, so neither was particularly aware of the impending change. 
Drafters of the bill felt that its tripartite effect conformed most 
closely to the reality of labor relations in Chile. The Government had 
always injected itself deeply into labor-management affairs, through the 
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Labor Code, the reajuste, the various work-related welfare measures; the 
mediation efforts of the Ministry of Labor; in addition to the use of 
police and soldiers to curb strikers' conduct and break strikes "contrary 
to the national interest." Its presence at the bargaining table under the 
new structure would simply acknowledge what everybody knew, that the Chilean 
government had always been a partner to collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, the general economy was becoming more and more characterized 
by State controls. Chile had long ago moved beyond the laissez-faire capitalist 
model to a mixed economy. A number of basic resource and service industries 
(with the glaring exception of copper) were state-run. There had been heavy 
price control since the 1930's. CORFO, the state corporation designed—in 
quintessential welfare-statist fashion—to take over profitless businesses, 
had been functioning since 1938. The problem for shapers of labor relations, 
therefore, was how the Government could insert itself into the dealings 
between private employers and unions so as to abet its own overall economic 
policies and at the same time conserve the supposed efficiencies of the 
private sector. They proposed to do so through the Tripartite Commissions. 
The State would participate directly in the bargaining process to ensure 
that the result would not contradict its policies, yet at the same time 
would respect the interests of the private parties, 
Whatever the theories underlying the proposed reform, the fact 
remains that the Frei government never put it into effect. Although it 
reflected the tripartite system called for by the CUT throughout its 
existence, it was precisely the mounting opposition of the CUT—not to this 
measure, but to the government in general—that prevented the Christian 
Democrats from implementing the law. The Frei government had sought to 
prevent union contracts from exceeding the cost-of-living rise. It had tried 
32 
to impose a forced-saving plan on workers, provoking a nationwide strike. 
It had attempted to divide the union movement by reforming the Labor Code 
to permit dual unionism, that is, to permit groups of workers in the same 
plant to divide into rival unions affiliated with ideologically homogeneous 
federations—specifically, a Christian Democratic federation opposed to a 
21 Communist and Socialist one. Although it promised the Tripartite structure 
they had long called for, union leaders would have viewed an attempt to 
establish the tripartite commissions as a further attempt by the government 
to undermine the labor movement. They were afraid the government would line 
up with employers against labor bargainers. The President's labor advisors, 
therefore, counselled him not to exercise the power granted in the 1968 law, 
22 judging the moment "inopportune." 
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4) The Allende Reform and its Context 
A. The Decree 
The Popular Unity (UP) government of Salvador Allende did not hesitate 
to set in motion the machinery for creating the tripartite commissions. 
Taking office in November, 1970, by the end of December the President had 
used the power given him by the 1968 law, issuing an executive decree to 
regulate the establishment of such commissions. 
Executive Decree 825 contains many features worth examing in detail. 
They contrast markedly to the features of the traditional collective bargaining 
process. Furthermore, their seemingly technical nature hides several important 
political and economic implications which will be a key to further discussions 
of the new system. 
The Decree vests in the President power to create a tripartite commission 
in any branch of industrial activity or in a subsector of an industry. Employers 
or employees of an industry may solicit a tripartite commission, but this is 
not necessary, nor does it oblige the President, to create a commission. 
A tripartite commission consists of nine members, three each from 
employers, employees and the government. They are empowered, as the original 
law indicated, to fix by majority vote minimum wages and conditions for their 
industry or, by unanimous vote, maximum wages and conditions which every 
employer and employee must comply with. 
Representatives of the private parties are appointed by the Minister 
of Labor from lists of nominees proposed by the "most representative" union 
or federation, for workers, and the "most representative" employers* group. 
"Most representative" is defined as the organization "which has a greater 
number of members." Private representatives have two-year terms and may 
continue in the office if their nominations are renewed. Government representatives 
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sit at the will of the executive. One of them is the commission's presiding 
officer. Five members constitute a quorum, of whom at least one must be 
a government representative. 
All employers and employees in an industry are bound by resolutions 
of its commission "in matters of its competence." Commissions have the power 
to "interpret the meaning and scope" of their own resolutions. 
The fluid language and structure provided in this Decree differs 
sharply from the minutiae of the Labor Code. Rather than regulating each 
step in the process with required deadlines, procedures, documents etc., it 
simply says, in effect: get together and bargain. The discretion allowed 
the Executive to establish a tripartite commission and define the scope of 
its jurisdiction also departs from the Code's strictures. One feature of the 
Code that the new decree conserves, however, is the heavy role of the government 
in the bargaining process. But instead of a burdensome bureaucratic load, we 
shall see that the government's role becomes lean, flexible and keenly political. 
B, Political and Economic Implications of the Decree 
The political Ingredients of the Decree are not hard to discern. The 
President's discretion in creating tripartite commissions ties their very 
existence to political considerations. In what industries will employers be 
most cooperative? In which will workers be most loyal to the UP parties? 
The vague "most representative" standard for the nomination of private 
representatives adds to the sweep of presidential discretion, since in the 
fragmented industrial relations scene a minority group of a particular political 
cast could turn out to have the "greater number of members." Most obvious 
is the presence itself of the government as an equal bargaining partner. No 
matter how neutral it pretends to be, it still has the swing votes that control 
the outcome of the process. 
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The Decree's possible economic effects lie in what the tripartite 
commissions are empowered to determine. They can set a standard agreement 
for an entire industry, an agreement that extends to all workers in the 
industry, whether they are organized or not. Like most industry-wide 
bargaining systems in the United States, to take an example, the Decree 
allows for a mimimum standard, a base above which local bodies can bargain 
for higher wages and conditions if they are able to get them. Such a system 
permits differences among profits, productivity, regional standards etc, to 
be taken into account. 
Alternatively, however, Decree 825 enables the commissions by unanimity 
of their members to set maximum wages and conditions; that is, fixed terms 
above which workers cannot bargain and below which employers cannot pay. 
On Its face, this provision means that differences in cost structure among 
individual firms become unrelated to the wages they have to pay. Small, labor-
intensive and under productive firms must pay the same as large scale, highly 
productive ones. When we consider that most industries in Chile are characterized 
by enormous differences in size, capitalization, productivity etc.* the 
Procrustean potential of a single standard labor contract for an entire industry 
becomes plain. When we consider that so far;all collective bargaining 
agreements reached by tripartite commissions in Chile have been by unanimity 
of their members, it becomes downright curious. How do they avoid the 
Procrustean result? This point will be taken up in sections 7 and 8. 
C. New Labor Relations under the UP 
Executive Decree 825 was issued within a context of significant increases 
in all facets of labor activity. Union organization jumped from 218 new 
*See table next page. 
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Structure of Manufacturing Industries In Chile 
Number of 
workers in 
.'firm 
1} 
i5'9 
,;10-19 
J20-49 
10-99 
-100-199 
200-499 
500-999 
,1,000+ 
Number of firms 
of that size 
range 
5,118 
3,009 
2,045 
649 
349 
219 
51 
28 
Number of workers 
in all firms of 
that size 
26,381 
35,700 
57,768 
44,724 
48,865 
64,635 
33,652 
41,669 
Motor Capacity 
of all firms 
of that size 
(HP) 
47,500 
66,474 
114,221 
96,663 
125,297 
214,058 
193,691 
317,967 
Electrical 
Energy 
consumed 
(thousands 
of KWH) 
30,626.9 
58,227.7 
115,550.6 
102,316.8 
144,774.5 
407,119.4 
318,927.3 
469,647.7 
Totals 11,468 353,394 1,175,871 1,647,190.9 
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non-agricultural unions in 1970 to 472 new unions in 1971 and over 700 in 
1972. Over 3/4s of the new unions were organized by empleados; that is, 
by white-collar, clerical, semi-professional-type workers. The more than 
300 new obrero (blue-collar) unions were mostly in smaller firms, in the 
24 
25-40 obrero range. 
Ministry of Labor officials attributed these patterns to two chief 
causes. First, the policy of the Ministry was to encourage the maximum of 
union organization. In prior years, it was explained, even under the Christian 
Democrats, it had been common for Ministry personnel to call the workers' 
employer for clearance when a group came to inquire about forming a union. 
Many who came for preliminary information were never heard from again. The 
intention now is to facilitate as much as possible the organization of unions. 
Secondly, Ministry officials asserted, many groups of workers were 
aware that the UP was a pro-union government, and figured-somewhat opportun-
istically--^ should form a union in order to get whatever benefits might 
arise from being organized. This was especially true, the officials felt, 
of empleado groups who had formerly been leary of organizing a union for 
25 
reasons of prestige. 
The first year of UP administration was also marked by a significant 
increase in the volume of collective bargaining. The number of actas de 
avenimiento (bargaining agreements) rose from 3,508 in 1970 to 5,282 in 1971.26 
As might be expected, increased collective bargaing also brought a rise in 
strike activity. After hovering around the 1,000 mark through the late 1960's, 
strikes increased to 1,819 in 1970, 2,696 in 1971 and 2,518 in 1972 (the 
1970 rise had two sources, according to Ministry of Labor officials: growing 
labor discontent with the Frei administration, and growing labor excitement 
about the UP campaign). 
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Strike activity was also characterized by the disproportional increase 
in illegal strikes. As we saw, this means no more than that the minutiae of 
Code-required procedure had not been fully complied with, or that public 
employees had struck. In Tnost prior years, between 2/3 and 3/4 of all strikes 
had been illegal. In 1971 and 1972, however, 4,929 out of 5,217-more than 
27 90%—were illegal strikes, 
Even more indicative of the changed nature of strike activity was the 
rise of illegal strikes in the manufacturing sector. Here, the proportion 
of legal to illegal strikes had been much narrower in the past, with legal 
strikes even averaging slightly higher than illegal strikes. In 1971, however, 
legal strikes dropped from 126 to 85, while illegal strikes rose from 179 
to 3A9.28 
Underneath those figures, labor relations under the UP were acquiring 
an entirely new nature. All the old rules were in suspension: private owner-
ship of productive means, immediate compensation for state expropriation, 
police enforcement of property rights, etc.-all the legal privileges that the 
owning class had built up to protect its social and economic status. 
A constant campaign promise of the UP had been to never use official 
violence against the working class. The bloody encounters of previous years, 
insisted Allende, from the 2,000 nitrate miners massacred in Iquique on 
December 21, 1907, to the eight copper miners and their wives killed under 
Frei at El Salvador mine on March 11, 1966, would never be repeated under a 
workers' government. It was a businessman's nightmare and a labor leader's 
dream: workers could strike with impunity, sure that their employer could 
not obtain their expulsion by the police. Practically all strikes were 
accompanied by occupation of the workplace, and often with owners or managers 
"detained" for talks (or "kidnapped", as the opposition usually claim.) 
39 
Along with the refusal to employ state power against the working class, 
the UP policy included the socialization of major private industries by one 
of two means: 1) "intervention"; that is, by the legally permitted takeover 
of struck companies, where the strike threatened national security or the 
well-being of the population; and 2) "requisition"—legally permitted takeover 
of companies guilty of economic malfeasance like excessive inventory or deliberate 
underproduction that threatened the well-being of the population. Strictly 
speaking, the government was supposed to return intervened or requisitioned 
firms to their owners when such a threat had passed. This transfer was at the 
discretion of the government, however, and the UP exercised its discretion 
by holding onto them, instituting programs of workers1 participation, and 
declaring that those on the list of the 91 "target" firms for the Area Social 
29 
were going to stay nationalized. 
Workers in many firms struck precisely for the purpose of being 
30 intervened. In many such cases, militant workers of the Revolutionary 
Workers Front led the strikes, demanding government intervention even where 
the firm was not on the list of those meant for the Area Social. They were 
often successful, despite opposition to such tactics from the UP—especially 
the Communist Party, which severely criticized this kind of "infantile ultra-
31 leftist" activity. The government lacked the technical personnel to manage 
all the struck firms—it was already thinly spread over those intended for 
the Area Social. Nonetheless, the government wanted even less to lose political 
ground to the Revolutionary Workers. In mid 1972, 36 of the listed 91 firms 
had passed to the Area Social and over one hundred firms not on the list were 
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temporarily under state management. 
The collective bargaining reform also took place in the context of 
a controversial UP economic policy. The basic idea was to raise production 
by increasing demand. Industrial output was running at only 60% of capacity 
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when the UP came to power. Many businessmen had deliberately cut production 
and employment in the two-month interval between Allende's election and his 
taking office, hoping to provoke economic chaos that would force the Army 
to step in. The UP ordered production stepped up, and threatened non-compliers 
with requisition of their companies. Prices were frozen and wages were 
raised 50%. It was not a true 50% raise, however, because inflation in the 
previous twelve months was 28%. The price freeze was the real demand-pusher. 
Usually, price rises followed close on the heels of a wage reajuste, so the 
cycle of inflation simply spun along. In this case, the price freeze coupled 
with the wage hike had the desired demand-raising effect. Chileans went on 
a buying spree, industrial production jumped to near-capacity, and an effective 
redistribution of income was accomplished. 
The short-run benefits of this policy are obvious. More meat on the 
table, more trips to the seashore, and other consumer delights bore out the 
campaign promises of the UP that things would be better under socialism. The 
contention of the left-wing parties for years, in fact, had been that the 
chief obstacle to general prosperity was the capitalist system that concentrated 
wealth in the hands of a few. Break the system, the argument went, and the 
reserve of wealth would flow out to the general population. The UP's initial 
measures gave the impression of confirming this old electoral ploy, in 
addition to simply rewarding its working class supporters and garnering more 
support among formerly ambivalent wage-earners. The short-term success of 
this policy was indicated by the results of municipal elections in 1971, when 
UP candidates obtained a majority of the votes. 
Whatever the political advantages of the above arguments and; policy, 
their economic fallacies are equally evident. It is not the concentration of 
redistributable income that constitutes the inequality of the capitalist system, 
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but the concentration of wealth, especially capital goods, and chiefly in 
the large, privately-owned business enterprises. In the long run,, the 
disproportionate wage rise would lead to shortages of consumer items workers 
would have just become accustomed to; hoarding and the inevitable black market 
that would result from the shortages; and the need for either rationing or 
government-sponsored inflation to bring supply and demand in line. 
The short-run high wage policy was actually more of a political than 
an economic policy. The political rewards of the "payoff," it was hoped, would 
outweigh the inevitable economic disadvantages. The fact that the chickens 
would come home to roost, however, was the main factor in the government's 
authentic economic policy. And an essential element of this policy had to 
be wage restraint of some form, in order to curb demand. Whether rationing 
or inflation, as well as outright wage controls, was the government's response, 
it amounted to wage restraint. 
A further reason why wage restraint lay at the heart of a coherent 
economic policy was found in the problems of the socialized sector of the 
economy. Production rose in this socialized sector, but the government was 
the victim of: a) its price freeze and wage hike, which affected socialized 
as well as private firms, and b) inefficiencies connected with the attempt 
to institute workers' participation, as well as mismanagement by government-
appointed managers. Rather than producing a profit that could be put to social 
uses in accordance with the government's platform—schools, housing, hospitals 
etc.'—the socialized companies showed losses. In order to reverse this trend, 
wages would have to be restrained so that the employees of the socialized 
companies would not eat up the entire surplus themselves. 
In the private sector, similar problems emerged. Though they were not 
targeted for nationalization, many small and medium-sized employers halted 
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reinvestment altogether. Instead of ploughing surplus back for new machinery, 
they invested it in foreign currency or simply consumed it themselves—an 
extra refrigerator, a longer vacation, a house on the shore, etc. Their 
employees, therefore, were working with steadily deteriorating machinery, 
even if additional capacity was utilized and overall production went up. 
If productivity continued to drop when production levelled off—as it had 
to do eventually^—unrestrained wages would drive the entire private sector 
into bankruptcy. Here, too, wages had to be limited in order to have an 
eventual surplus for reinvestment. But in the labor sphere, the government 
was pushing the formation of stronger unions that would go after higher wages; 
indeed, had to obtain them, if the government was to keep the political support 
of the rank-and-file workers. 
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Part II 
5) The Textile Industry 
A. The Structure of the Textile Industry 
The structure of the textile industry reflects the general structure 
of Chilean manufacturing industries described earlier (page 35 ) : a handful 
of large, modern, high-paying plants employing hundreds or thousands of 
workers, a sizeable number of medium-sized, moderate-pay companies in the 
50-500 employee range, spreading down to thousands of small shops and home 
manufacturing enterprises which pay minimal wages. The tables on the following 
page sum up the industry structure much better than any prose description. It 
will be evident that such wide differences raise problems for the establishment 
of a single, industry-wide labor agreement—problems whose attempted solutions 
we shall later discuss. 
B. Labor Relations in the Textile Industry 
Within the traditional labor relations system, the textile industry 
had been marked by a high level of unionization. By 1970, over 40,000 textile 
workers were organized—about 2/3 of those eligible (in firms of 25 or more 
workers). The larger firms were organized earliest, most in the 1925-1950 
period. Since then, union organization filtered down through progressively 
smaller plants, though even in 1970 the average size of a new union was over 
50 workers. 
After a sharp jump in union organization in the first years of the 
Frei government, new textile unions fell into three years of slow growth. In 
the first year of the UP regime, however, textile unionization—like 
unionization overall^increased to a record level: 52 new unions, compared 
to an average of 12 in each of the previous three years. But unlike the 
overall pattern of union organization in Chile, the vast majority of unions 
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33 Structure of Textile Industry by Firm Siz£ 
workers 
5-9* 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ 
//f irms, 
manufac 
238 
185 
212 
88 
36 
30 
16 
//firms, clothing 
manufacturing 
29.6 
23 
26.3 
10.9 
4.5 
3.7 
2 
336 
192 
122 
38 
23 
7 
3 
46 
26 
16 
5 
3 
1 
0 
6 
6 
8 
4 
2 
4 
Total Industry 
574 38.1 
377 24.8 
334 21.5 
126 8.2 
59 3.8 
37 2.4 
19 1.2 
Total 805 100 721 100 1,526 100 
*There are thousands more business with under five workers. Most of these are family projects 
which do not reflect the usual employer-employee relationship, Accordingly, this data is 
based on firms with over five workers. The source if IV Censo Nacional de Manufacturas, pp. 52-
53. ' ~ ' 
Distribution of Textile Labor Force by Firm Size 
firm 
size 
5-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ 
total workers, 
textile manu-
facturing 
1,170 
2,241 
6,224 
5,929 
5,036 
9,031 
17,212 
% 
2.5 
4.8 
13.3 
12.6 
10.8 
19.3 
36.7 
total workers, 
clothes manu-
facturing 
1,667 
2,304 
3,438 
2,567 
3,242 
2,116 
2,041 
% 
9.6 
13.3 
19.6 
14.5 
19.3 
11.9 
11.8 
total workers, 
wh •le industry 
2,837 
4,545 
9.662 
8,496 
8,278 
11,147 
19,253 
% 
4.4 
7.2 
15.0 
13.3 
12.9 
17.3 
29.9 
Total 46,843 100 17,375 100 64,218 
Source: IV Censo, pp. 52-53. 
Distribution of Textile Wages 
According to Firm Size (1967) 
100 
Number of workers in firm Average annual wage per worker 
5-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ 
2,457 
3,055 
4,073 
4,777 
5,233 
6,202 
7,480 
escudos 
it 
n 
ii 
H 
II 
n 
Source: Censo, p. 
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Size 
of 
Firms 
5-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ 
100 200 300 400 500 
Number of Firms in that Size Range 
600 
Size 
of 
Firms 
5-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 " 
200-499 ' 
500+ < ' ' 
5',000 10',000 15,000 20,000 
Number of Workers in Firms of that Size Range 
Size 
of 
Firms 
5-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ 
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 
Average Wage per Worker in Firms of that Size 
Range (1967 escudos) 
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in the textile industry—220 out of 258 in 1971—were blue collar unions. 
This reflected the obrero status of most textile workers, a fact which will 
be important in the later discussion of the political nature of textile workers.* 
There was a marked tendency for only larger, unionized firms to engage 
in collective bargaining. 1970 figures show a collective bargaining agreement 
in only eleven out of 755 firms with under ten workers. As firm size increases, 
however, the percentage of those with bargaining agreements also rises. 
Collective bargaining agreements are found in sixteen out of 21 firms with 
over 500 employees.* 
The maturity and experience of a textile union is indicated by the 
patterns of their strike activity. Illegal strikes always greatly outnumbered 
legal strikes in the nation as a whole.(including public employees' strikes). 
Even in the private manufacturing sector the gap was close. In the textile 
industry illegal strikes were comparatively minimal—three oat of sixty-three 
in 1968 and 1969. Even in 1970, the election year in which illegal strike 
activity greatly increased, there were still more legal than illegal strikes 
in the textile industry. This indicates that textile unions were generally 
careful—under former governments—about complying with the Labor Code's 
procedural requirements, a fact which itself reflected textile labor union 
officers' experience and familiarity with the traditional system. 
Strike data also show that smaller firms, especially those with less 
than twenty workers, were much less likely to strike than larger, more 
unionized firms. The figures also show that strikes in the textile industry 
tended to be long, usually over a month in duration. This suggests that labor 
leaders' experience was matched by rank-and-file discipline and determination 
*See tables on following pages. 
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to fight through long and bitter strikes.* 
The changed nature of labor relations under the UP was amply demonstrated 
in the textile industry. A huge rise in illegal strikes in 1971 affirmed the 
breakdown of "normal" relations, indicating that the traditionally careful 
textile unions were now impatient to take advantage of their new protections 
under the government they had helped elect. The six illegal strikes of firms 
with over 500 workers, and their comparatively short duration, reflect the 
government's plans to nationalize big industry and create the Area Social: 
the government intervened each of these struck plants shortly after the strikes 
began, appointed a government manager, set up worker participation programs 
34 
and stated that these firms were in the Area Social to stay. 
C. The Textile Industry and the UP Program 
Any Chilean government has to develop a policy for the textile industry 
and its needs. With ten percent of the gross product in manufacturing and 
over ten percent of the manufacturing labor force, the industry occupies a 
key position in Chile's economic structure. Even more significant under the 
UP government, however, was the possibility of making the textile industry 
a testing ground for its strategy of a multi-class alliance. The chief 
35 
elements of this alliance were the working class and the small bourgeoisie. 
The UP's victorious electoral program had promised to keep hands off small 
36 
businessmen: to only expropriate the large, monopoly-tending enterprises. 
Policies proposed for the small businessman included eased lines of credit from 
the nationalized banks, tax incentives, and a favorable price policy. The 
structure of the textile industry, with its large number of small and medium-
sized businesses dominated by the handful of giants, gave the UP an opportunity 
37 to put this program into action. 
*See tables on following pages. 
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Growth of Unionization in the Textile Industry 
Date 
1925-30 
1931-35 
1936-40 
1941-45 
1946-50 
1951-55 
1956-60 
1961-65 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
Total** 
//blue-
collar 
unions 
4 
4 
16 
14 
13 
22 
4 
14 
31 
29 
6 
8 
12 
43 
220 
^workers 
1,420 
1,337 
6,949 
2,986 
4,724 
3,532 
352 
2,324 
3,831 
2,259 
250 
694 
626 
2,223 
33,507 
average 
size 
355 
334 
434 
213 
394 
161 
88 
166 
124 
78 
42 
87 
52 
52 
152 
#white-
collar 
unions 
— 
— 
1 
1 
— 
3 
— 
3 
4 
8 
2 
3 
4 
_9 
38 
//workers 
— 
~ 
466 
6,000* (fed.) 
— 
210 
— 
304 
1,273 
898 
121 
115 
257 
495 
10,139 
average 
size 
— 
— 
466 
— 
— 
70 
— 
101 
318 
112 
61 
38 
64 
55 
112 
total 
unions 
4 
4 
17 
15 
13 
25 
4 
17 
35 
37 
8 
11 
16 
52 
258 
total 
workers 
1,420 
1,337 
7,415 
8,986 
4,724 
3,742 
352 
2,628 
5,104 
3,157 
371 
809 
883 
2,718 
43,646 
** These totals will not be entirely up-to-date since they do not take into account fluctuations in firm growth 
since the organization of the union. Two factors suggest their general accuracy: the larger firms, which have 
survived at about the same size, were organized early, and in the period since the mid-1950's, during which the 
smaller firms were organized, employment in the textile industry has remained constant. 
49 
Date 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
//blue-
collar 
unions 
(total) 
1,129 
1,261 
1,383 
1,437 
1,599 
//workers 
177,273 
189,815 
194,228 
197,651 
203,282 
increase 
in # 
unions 
— 
132 
122 
54 
162 
Since 
//white-
collar 
unions 
(total) 
1,904 
2,163 
2,405 
2,569 
2,879 
1967 
//workers 
208,475 
222,212 
232.090 
239,323 
252,924 
increase 
in // 
unions 
-<-
259 
242 
164 
310 
total 
unions 
3,033 
3,424 
3,788 
4,006 
4,478 
total 
workers 
385,748 
412,027 
426,318 
436,974 
456,206* 
Woes not include about 150,000 public employees, organized into associations affiliated 
w^ith the CUT. 
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Strikes by Obreros in Chilean Textile Industry 
according to Firm Size 
1968 1969 
Ilomber L e g a l 
0f S t r i ke s 
jlorkers 
Illegal 
Strikes 
0-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ (now 
In Area 
Social) 
4 
7 
7 
4 
4 
Tota l 
S t r i k e s 
4 
8 
7 
4 
4 
Average 
dura t ion 
(days) 
24 
60 
33 
77 
74 
127 
Total 
Total 
{Strikes 
in mfg. 
sector 
28 
124 
1 
95 
29 
219 
Legal Illegal 
Strikes Strikes 
2 
3 
14 
8 
1 
3 
Total 
Strikes 
2 
3 
14 
8 
1 
4 
Average 
duration 
26 
58 
52 
35 
8 
45 
32 
123 114 
34 
237 
30 
Number 
of 
Workers 
0-9 
10-19 
20-49 
50-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500+ 
Total 
Total 
mfg. 
sector 
Legal 
Strikes 
1 
3 
8 
5 
2 
3 
1 
23 
126 
Illegal 
Strikes 
— 
4 
3 
1 
5 
1 
3 
17 
179 
Total 
Strikes 
1 
7 
11 
6 
7 
4 
4 
40 
305 
Average 
duration 
35 
37 
24 
23 
29 
14 
21 
Legal 
Strikes 
2 
4 
4 
6 
1 
— 
17 
85 
Ille gal 
Strikes 
1 
3 
7 
2 
7 
5 
6 
31 
349 
Total 
Strikes 
1 
5 
11 
6 
13 
6 
6 
48 
434 
Average 
duration 
8 
41 
33 
29 
23 
12 
9 
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The textile industry also provided an opportunity for the government 
to show it could manage the economy. The UP was venturing a large measure 
of its prestige in the textile industry, intending to nationalize the large 
firms, institute programs of workers' participation, and at the same time 
increase production. The large nationalized firms were the chief suppliers 
of the businesses still in the private sector. Being able to coordinate 
production and distribution between the two thus became a key element of 
the government's economic program. 
Especially relevant in the changed political context of post-1970 
Chile was the fact that the largest textile firms were controlled by three 
highly conspicuous family groups who epitomized the monopolies the UP had 
promised to destroy. The Area Social, said the government, would be composed 
of the copper and other natural resources industries and of the major private 
manufacturing enterprises that "dominated" the economy. The few large 
textile firms were among these dominant companies. That their owners' well-
known sumptuous living style fit the traditional image of the grasping 
capitalist made it that much less objectionable when the government did 
step in and intervene or requisition the textile giants. 
Seventeen textile firms were on the UP's list of the 91 firms meant 
to constitute the Area Social. By mid-1972, thirteen of these companies 
had been passed to the Area Social•and six others had been also taken over 
and announced for inclusion in the Area Social. All but two of these nineteen 
firms employed more than 500 workers, and the other two had nearly 500. In 
other words, the government had nationalized the highest paying, highest-
capitalized and highest-productive textile firms.* 
"These nationalized firms had a collective bargaining system separate from that of 
the nrivate sector, and therefore are not included in this study,» Since 
he texlfle industry follows so faithfully a correlation of factors like wage 
and productivity levels to firm size, however, the private sector still 
reflects the pyramidical structure described above, 
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D. Employers' and Employees' Federations 
The kind of centralized collective bargaining structure proposed by 
plant-byfplant structure 
Executive Decree 825 instead of the anarchy of the traditional / was one 
means of forming a consistent small business policy and at the same time 
adjusting relationships between the Area Social and the Area Privada. Other 
factors, however, were taken into account in the decision to establish a 
Tripartite Commission for the private sector of the textile industry. First, 
there were already employers' and employees' federal organizations: the 
Instituto Textil for large employers, the AMPICH (Small Business Association) 
for small employers, and the FENATEX (National Textile Workers Federation) 
39 
for employees 
The Instituto Textil was a typical big business pressure group complete 
with researchers, a legal staff and lobbyists. It had begun in 1960 with 
forty members, and grown steadily to a membership of one hundred thirty-five 
by 1971, which included most of the large companies. The AMPICH, on the 
other hand, had nearly five hundred textile members in 1971, more than 80% of 
them with less than twenty-five workers. Over three hundred of these members 
joined in 1971 alone, mostly because it was known that the AMPICH directorship 
included some UP party members. Small businessmen were hopeful that the 
connection would prove beneficial. 
The decisive factor for establishing a Tripartite Commission, from the 
government's point of view, was the political reliability of the FENATEX. 
With slightly under 30,000 members in 1971, the FENATEX joined about 40% 
of the total number of workers in the industry (070,000) and approximately 
75% of unionized textile workers (@43,000). Founded by Communist activities 
in 1940, the FENATEX had remained under PC dominance despite a growth of 
Socialist power. The primarily obrero status of most textile workers forged 
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runs deep, but it owes itself to the tough leadership of their Communist 
and Socialist union officers, and those officers' ability to obtain the 
workers' trade unionist goals. 
This UP control of the unions was essential if its nationalization and 
workers' participation programs were to avoid rank-and-file resistance. But 
the high degree of union democracy in Chile (both local union and national 
federation officers are elected by direct, secret and relatively clean 
balloting) foreclosed heavy-handed methods of control. Union leaders, 
whatever their political affiliation, had to deliver the goods—higher wages, 
shorter hours, improved conditions etc. While UP party members dominated 
union leadership, there was a large Christain Democratic presence among 
the rank-and-file—approximately one-fourth, according to the 1972 national 
union federation elections (see note p. 53). There was also strong pressure 
from the UP's left, from the Revolutionary Workers' Front, the workers' branch 
of the MIR. Both Christain Democrats and Revolutionary Workers were anxious 
to find grounds for charging a sellout by UP union leaders in order to enhance 
their own power in the labor movement. To avoid losing leadership positions 
in local unions to them, Communist and Socialist union leaders had to put 
traditional bread-and-butter issues at the head of their priorities. 
There was a sharp jump in textile unionization in the first year of 
UP government, and many of these new unionists lacked the combative experience 
and the ties to the UP parties of workers from established textile unions. 
It seemed to the government's advantage, therefore, to make the experienced 
workers—most of them associated with the FENATEX—the core of a united bloc 
of textile workers, rather than risk losing the new unions to Christain Democracy, 
already the third power in the labor movement. 
Of course, it was also beneficial for the FENATEX to encourage such 
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an alignment. Like other union federations, including the CUT itself, the 
FENATEX was at the same time an extension of UP political parties and an 
independent organism interested in its own growth and prosperity. Besides 
meeting the parties' political needs, a focusing of power in the FENATEX 
-: ,.„,.«„=«. A rpntralized collective bargaining structure 
would serve its own interest. A centraiizeu 
was one way to accomplish this goal, but only if a substantial increase of 
wages could be won. Any attempt at union-sponsored wage restraint would 
discredit the FENATEX or open the door of leadership to the Christain Democrats 
and Revolutionary Workers. 
A further impetus toward a Tripartite Commission lay in the fact that 
the FENATEX had already sought to bargain with several employers together. 
As early as 1953, it tried to present a pliejo unico, a common set of demands, 
to the employers of its member unions. It had no success until 1971, when it 
finally managed to bargain collectively with eleven of the large companies 
from the Institute Textil. At that point, the establishment of a Tripartite 
Commission for the industry was already being planned, and one of the provisions 
of this 1971 multiemployer agreement was to "participate directly or by 
means of representation in the national Tripartite Commission which will be 
established to study the implementation of a standard wage in the textile 
,,40 
industry. 
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6) The Bargaining Setting 
A. The Bargaining Parties 
In his first two years of government, President Allende invoked 
Executive Decree 825 to create tripartite commissions in six branches of 
economic activity: textiles and clothes manufacturing, construction, 
printing, retail stores, bakeries and gas stations. Most of these activities 
shared the characteristics discussed in the preceeding section-the presence 
of employers' and employees' federal organizations, efforts at prior multi-
firm bargaining, coexistence of large firms alongside small shops, and 
political reliability of the employees' organizations that would be negotiating 
for the workers, 
Allende lost no time in establishing a Tripartite Commission for the 
textile industry. In early 1971, soon after the promulgation of Decree 825, 
employer and employee representatives were called together to begin planning 
the negotiations. Preliminary talks soon rounded into actual negotiation. By 
October they were discussing hard issues. 
In exercising its power of appointment to the Tripartite Commission, 
the government originally named three members each from the FENATEX and the 
Institute Textil, the parties who had already engaged in some form of 
multi-firm bargaining. Rumblings of discontent from small businessmen, 
however, quickly changed this arrangement. Their unhappiness threatened 
the multi-class alliance that was a pillar of the UP program.41 An AMPICH 
representative, therefore, was substituted for one of the Instituto Textil 
members on the Commission. 
None of the private organizations could be said to be fully representative 
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of its sector of the textile industry. The Instituto Textil grouped about 
one hundred thirty-five members, a small portion of the over fifteen hundred 
firms in the industry/2 The AMPICH had about five hundred textile members, 
so even joining its quantity to that of the Instituto Textil, a majority 
did not result. The FENATEX was also a minority representative. About 
20,000 textile workers out of the 50,000 still in the private sector were 
FENATEX members. 
This alignment of bargaining parties also entailed a dominance of 
large firm interests on the Tripartite Commission. The AMPICH representative 
was the only small firm spokesman. The hundreds of medium-sized firms in 
the 20-200 employee range were entirely absent. The Institute Textil, on 
the other hand, with two of the three employer representatives, was almost 
exclusively made up of larger and higher-paying firms. The FENATEX itself 
tended to group unions from larger plants where workers were better paid. 
Many students of labor relations will spot in this situation the 
possibility that a relatively high wage, which the larger firms would 
usually be better able to pay, could be exchanged for labor peace. Such a 
deal would tend to drive many smaller competitors out of business, unable 
to meet increased wage costs of high industry-wide agreement. Their market 
would shift to the larger firms. The increased demand upon the latter 
could be served by increasing capital investment, thus raising productivity 
and allowing the higher wage in the larger firms without immediately cutting 
into employment there (though employees of the smaller firms would be out of 
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luck). On the surface, the situation appeared ripe for such a classic 
big union-big company mutual back-scratching deal.* 
One should not assume, however, that this sort of "normal" market 
behavior, characteristic of many industry-wide collective bargaining contexts 
in capitalist countries, would operate in Chile. There had not been a "free" 
market in textiles since the 1930's when the Popular Front government put 
price controls on articles of popular consumption, and on products of large 
manufacturers whether or not they were intended for consumption. Furthermore, 
the same reform years saw the creation of sweeping social security obligations 
for employers which ate deeply into their profits. These payments often 
i 44 
doubled employers labor costs. There was nothing to prevent the government, 
especially a workers' government, from cutting the large firms' prices (that 
is, cutting prices and only enforcing the cut against large firms) or, 
more likely, raising their social security payments, thus putting their 
increased surplus to social rather than private advantage. A market incentive 
for such a "deal" with the big unions, therefore, was lacking. 
Such an assumption of "rational" economic behavior would also overlook 
the natures of the Chilean labor market and the struggles of Chilean unions. 
One effect of foreign penetration in most underdeveloped countries is to induce 
employers in those countries, whether their companies are foreign or domestically 
owned, to import labor-saving devices and thus cut employment while paying 
a relatively high wage (though still, in the case of multi-nationals, less 
than the metropole wage). They are often aided in this effort by their 
unions. In Chile, however, the unions were organized by Communist and 
Socialist party militants. Since the base of both union and party strength was 
*The American coal industry is a notable example, The United Mine Workers 
and big companies collaborated to such a degree that they were found guilty 
of violating U.S. anti-trust laws. 
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the mass political influence of the working class, high employment levels 
was a constant goal. The textile industry was no exception. A 1962 UN 
study named excessive employment as the chief cause of low productivity in 
the industry, estimating that some firms could cut their work force as much 
as by half without a drop in production.47 But employers dared not try it. 
The combined political power of the workers and the left-wing parties prevented 
any such drastic reduction in employment. The relatively progressive social 
legislation that has always characterized Chilean government (even conservative 
governments did not go backwards) included, over the years, job security 
legislation that dissuaded employers from large-scale firings or layoffs 
(though it did not prevent selective firing of "troublemakers.") In general, 
that is, Chilean unions have traditionally sought high employment and job 
security before high wages. The moment when their parties achieved executive 
power by a 2% margin in a three-way race was not the moment to start taking 
layoffs in exchange for higher wages. 
There was a further curb on such collusion, especially for employers. 
Too much success would probably mean expropriation. This aspect is discussed 
in the next section of the text. 
The Tripartite Commission also was marked by a political dominance: 
that of the Communist Party. The PC majority in the FENATEX assured that two 
of the three workers' representatives on the. Commission were PC activists 
(the third was a Socialist). The presiding government representative, more-
over (the only one who participated-the other two were merely signatures to 
make things official) was also a Communist. Since the UP mode of government 
is contacts and lines of its member parties,49 the textile bargaining process 
became subject to the Communist position, which linked together worker and 
government representatives. This was not necessarily an inconvenience for 
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employers. The PC is universally recognized as the most conservative party 
of the UP coalition, emphasizing order, discipline, responsibility, productivity, 
i 5 0 
etc.--values with which employers had no cause for quarrel. 
B. The Psychological Setting 
In addition to these physiognomical aspects of the Tripartite Commission, 
an important psychological force affected the bargaining setting. The 
breakdown of traditional labor relations through the tomas (seizures of 
factories by workers) and government intervention and requisition was most 
pronounced in the textile industry. Thirteen of the largest textile businesses 
had already been taken over. Smaller firms not on the list of the 91 targets 
for nationalization, however, had also been intervened or requisitioned, and 
six of them were announced for inclusion in the permanent Area Social. The 
UP was not entirely happy about the need to intervene or requisition the 
smaller firms; its technical resources were already spread thinly to manage 
the firms meant for the Area Social. On the other hand, it could not break 
its promise to never use force against striking workers, even when the strikes 
were led by "ultras" from the MIR and the left wing of the Socialist Party. 
Intervention, reluctant as it might be, was often the only solution to a 
conflict. 
Instead of bargaining from a position of strength, as was the case 
when they simply had to outwait a strike, employers were bargaining from 
a position of weakness. Employers of the larger still-private companies, 
most of which were members of the Instituto Textil, were especially vulnerable. 
A strike, and they might never see their factory again. 
It was due to the changed nature of labor relations under the UP 
that employers had even consented to participate in the Tripartite Commission. 
Under prior governments, employers' groups had always stiffly opposed plans 
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to make the government a party to the collective bargaining process. With 
the threat of a strike and possible intervention hanging over them, however, 
employers of the larger firms decided that cooperation was the safest course. 
Their idea was to gain time: the UP had six years to the next presidential 
elections. If, as was generally felt, the opposition ran a single candidacy 
against the UP in 1976, the opposition would likely win. Employers were 
hopeful that the most extreme measures of the UP, including intervention of 
private companies, would then be reversed. In the meantime, they felt, 
obstinacy would only serve to provoke the government to break the constitutional 
bounds that they saw as the eventual solution to their problems. Most were 
convinced, in fact, that six years of UP government would disenchant the 
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voters to such an extent that the Left would never again be elected to power. 
C, The Economic Setting 
The bargaining setting was also affected by the state of the textile 
market. The government's sweeping income-redistribution program—wages were 
raised 50% soon after Allende took office, while prices were frozen—had led 
to a huge increase in demand for consumer goods. Small manufacturers benefitted 
most from this change, because their prices were not controlled to the same 
extent as those of the large companies. The government's efforts to build 
support among small businessmen had made for a purposeful non-enforcement of 
price controls over small shops. 
The rise in demand and the effective absence of a price ceiling for 
small firms tended to narrow the effects of differences in size, capitalization, 
productivity etc. Small firms were in a better position to meet higher 
wage costs, since they did not have to worry about selling their products, 
even at a higher price. The large firms, however, faced the squeeze of price 
controls to dampen the advantages of the increased demand. A further problem 
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for larger firms, as we saw in the introduction, was that they had nearly 
all put a complete halt to reinvestment after Allende's election in 1970. 
The threat of nationalization if they became too big and too successful, plus 
the general uncertainty of the economic climate, led their owners to simply 
spend all their profits instead of ploughing them back into the business, 
As a result, they faced the probability of deteriorating machinery and 
lower productivity levels. A high wage settlement would thus meet with price 
controls outside the plant and lower productivity inside. It was a curious 
reversal of the expected effect of industry-wide bargaining. The smaller 
firms were relatively indifferent to an increase in wage costs, while the 
53 large firms wanted to avoid it. 
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7) Issues In the Bargaining Process 
A. The Bargaining Process 
Textile negotiators faced a formidable task. Three representatives 
from each side, plus the one active government representative, were responsible 
for reaching a collective bargaining agreement that would affect thousands 
of employers and tens of thousands of workers. Except for the AMPICH delegate, 
they were only familiar with the problems of large-sized, more highly-capitalized 
in an industry characterized by wide fluctuations in size and efficiency. 
The bargaining environment was hot, kindled by the increasing social polarization, 
political ferment and a growing economic crisis. How would they proceed? 
B, Preparation 
Like in the whole of Chilean industry, textile collective bargaining 
had never been grounded in technical criteria. The cost-of-living index was 
the dominant consideration, along with agreements reached by other employers 
and employees in the industry. In its initial bargaining experience, the 
textile Tripartite Commission continued this trend. No information related 
to costs, productivity, efficiency etc. was gathered. The cost-of-living index 
for 1971 showed an inflation of 22%, but figures for the 12 month period 
from March, 1971, to March, 1972, when the agreement was negotiated, gave 
a 34% rise. This was the figure around which they would negotiate the basic 
increases. 
First, representatives undertook informal surveys, often by telephone, 
to determine what levels of wages and benefits were being paid and what kind 
of increases would be acceptable. FENATEX representatives consulted the 
officers of member unions in visits and in plenary conventions. Both sides 
drew up outlines of wages and benefits being paid by firms of various sizes 
for reference in negotiating sessions. Already in this initial bargaining 
64 
stage, the centralizing effect of the shift to a tripartite commission is 
evident. Where before all of a plant's workers would gather to fashion the 
pliego, as required by the Labor Code, now only union officers had an input, 
and even that was informal. The effective say in preparing the bargaining 
policy and positions fell to the FENATEX. In the same way, where formerly 
an employer confronted his own workers independently of other employers, 
now he just informed the Commission members what he paid and what he would 
like to pay, and waited for their decision. 
C. Basic Wage Hike 
The political colorings ofrthe bargaining process filled it with 
ironies and contradictions. The basic issue was the across-the-board 
percentage increase. Large employers wanted to hold it down, on one hand, 
because their surplus was already being squeezed by the government's price 
ceilings and wage increases of the previous year. On the other hand, they 
did not want so small a hike that left-wing workers gained support for a 
toma and possible subsequent intervention. FENATEX representatives also 
wanted to avoid losing ground to the leftists. To maintain a strong presence 
among rank-and-file, especially in this first attempt to negotiate an industry 
wide agreement, the FENATEX people had to get an increase substantially higher 
than the index figure in order to show a concrete gain in living standard. 
At the same time, they were aware that overall economic development depended 
at the present juncture on a healthy private sector. They did not want to 
drive firms into bankruptcy with excessive wage costs, which would require 
the government to take them over without being able to run them. 
As a result of these various impulses, the parties found themselves 
in the incongruous position of employing the same agrument against each other: 
the threat of ultra-left tomas. "If you don't ante up," said the FENATEX, in 
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effect, "we're not responsible for what the companeros in the Revolutionary 
Workers' Front do." "If you don't come down," responded the employers, "we'll 
let you and the companeros have the bloody factories and you'll have more 
i.54 
headaches than you've got now. 
Despite this exchange, the employers were in a worse position. As 
long as they could hold on to their companies, they conserved the hope of 
being restored to their accustomed powers with a change of government. That 
was still years away, however—1976, assuming the maintenance of Chile's 
constitutional process. The FENATEX and the UP, though, were prepared if 
it came to a crisis to take more factories even if it did cause headaches in 
the short run, In the long run, a larger socialized sector solidified their 
overall control of the economy, shrinking the opposition's economic base even 
further, 
Higher-paid, happy workers meant political support for the government 
and the FENATEX, and continued private ownership for the employers. Too 
highly-paid workers, however, meant that re-investment would become impossible 
even if the government convinced businessmen they could re-invest without fear 
of expropriation. It also meant a smaller surplus for tax sources to fund 
the government's social programs. Each of these, in turn, meant a loss of 
overall political support in the general population, especially from the 
marginal sectors divided from the higher-wage unionized sector. The object, 
if it was possible, was to find a wage level that would make everybody happy. 
D. Fringe Benefits 
The next major bargaining issue was fringe benefits. This was a 
ticklish problem for the FENATEX representatives. The thousands of small 
shop workers not previously covered by a collective bargaining agreement had 
no fringe benefits other than those that went with the social welfare programs 
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of past governments. Those with agreements, on the other hand, had at least 
a few, and in the larger companies had a wide variety of benefits, often 
bordering on the exotic. The FENATEX negotiators knew that many such benefits 
perpetuated a paternalistic air in labor-management relations, contrary to 
the revolutionary spirit they wanted to promote. At the same time, workers 
in small shops wanted to obtain them, while those who had them considered 
them legitimate conquests and appreciated their "according to need" distribution 
Any significant cutback in benefits, even if it meant an increase in the 
regular wage, would cause enormous discontent among the bases and menace the 
FENATEX1s centralized control. 
The employers' representatives wanted to cut benefits and were willing 
to make up the difference in wages. It would be a saving for them, sparing 
them increased clerical costs and sporadic labor troubles related to benefits.* 
However, they did not want to entirely replace fringes with wages. The fringe 
system was so deeply 'ingrained in the minds of the workers, they felt, that 
the wage substitution would soon be forgotten and once again workers would 
start combatting for lunch money, bus fare, birth, marriage and death bonuses, 
etc. 
Between these two positions, it was clear that fringes were going 
to undergo some limitation; they would not include Christmas toys or funds 
to celebrate May 1. Nonetheless, they would have to be ample enough to win 
support for the FENATEX from workers in small shops and maintain support in 
larger plants, 
*For example, one fairly common fringe benefit provides that the employer will 
provide milk for the employees' lunch. If a dairy failed to deliver the milk 
for a few days for reasons beyond the employer's control, employees would 
often undertake a slow-down to show their discontent. 
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E. Existing Wage Differentials 
A third issue facing the negotiators was how to allow for the wide 
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differences in existing wage costs among small, medium and large-sized firms. 
Small employers could not be expected to meet all at once the same wage levels 
of the larger firms, even though they were in a better position to provide a 
raise. Nor in matters of fringe benefits, which were formerly confined to those 
firms with collective bargaining agreements, was it likely that the small em-
ployer could pay out the often enormous benefits unionized workers obtained. 
On the other hand, wages in this small-shop sector were in general lamentably-
low and benefits non-existent. Employers representatives agreed that a substan-
tial hike was necessary. In normal times, this would have produced a sharp 
clash between them and the small employers they represented, who would have re-
sented a large increase as a selling out of their interests by bigger competitors 
who did not face their cost difficulties. Thanks to the government's demand-
boosting economic policy and hands-off price policy, small employers had never 
had it better. They were in a position to meet substantial wage increases. As 
for fringe benefits, they could be introduced gradually into small employers' 
cost structures so as to provide a concrete improvement to the workers, who 
formerly had nothing, without brusquely altering those cost structures. 
F. Empleado-Obrero Distinction 
Another problem for the Tripartite Commission was how to handle the stub-
born old distinction between empleados and obreros. Erasing this division, the 
source of so much division, rivalry and favoritism in labor relations (see p. 15), 
was an electoral promise of the UP, part of a plan to pass an entirely new Labor 
Code, This project was still being drafted, however. Separate unions with dis-
* See Table, p. 
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tinct contracts continued to co-exist in each plant. Prolonging the distinction 
would mean the Commission had to negotiate two full contracts instead of one. 
Empleados ware generally jealous of their perogatives and would probably resent 
being lumped with obreros. These, however, would be even more resentful of 
continued discrimination after repeated promises to rectify it. Obreros were 
in the industry 5° 
far the greater number/- nearly 60,000, compared to about 10,000 empleados. 
Vote-getting interests in both national and union politics disposed the govern-
ment and FENATEX representatives to do away with the distinction. Employers 
liked the distinction. It was always advantageous to have a divided work force. 
But it was so inimical to what the majority of workers wanted and what the govern-
ment and the FENATEX needed that it was not likely to last. 
G. Degree of Pre-emption 
The broadest issue the representatives had to deal with was one that 
went to the core of the new bargaining system: to what extent would the Tripar-
tite Commission pre-empt the power of individual owners and unions to determine 
conditions of work in their plants? The language of the law enabled the Commis-
sion to take everything into its hands. It could simply inform employers and 
unions of its decisions, leaving them the obligation of complying without the right 
to negotiate alternative or additional terms. On the other hand, the Commission 
could limit the terms of its agreement and leave the workers and employers of 
individual firms free to alter them or add conditions not dealt with by the Com-
mission. 
For each of the three parties on the Commission, going too far in either 
direction carried dangers. A single, all-encompassing agreement that cut off the 
independent power of the local unions would undermine the local union officers 
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loyal to the FENATEX and open the door of leadership to Christian Democrats 
and FTP militants who could find in this a good reason for charging a sell-
out. Among employers, such an agreement—which, whatever its final terms, we 
going to be favorable to the workers—would generate resentment among em-
ployers accustomed to being masters in their own houses, especially those medium-
sized employers who felt unrepresented to begin with. The more rigid the final 
agreement, the more pronounced this reaction would be. As for the government, 
it faced the ire of both unions and employers. The limits that a monolithic 
agreement would impose on their freedom of action would seem as a betrayal 
of the government's promises: to unions that their power would be increased, 
to employers that the government would encourage small and medium-sized business-
men. 
An overly flexible agreement carried the polar danger of undermining the 
authority of the Commission itself. To achieve the goals set for the new bar-
gaining system—improved wages and conditions, increase of FENATEX and UP in-
fluence among textile workers, coordination with the socialized textile firms, 
an end to haphazard and destructive strikes, etc.—it was essential that the 
Commission establish itself as the central bargaining power with a firm, respect-
ed agreement. A loose, guide-line-type agreement that left too much to the wills 
of individual unions and employers would return the collective bargaining struc-
ture to its former fragmented state of firm-by-firm bargaining. 
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8) The Agreement 
The text of the agreement reached by the Tripartite Commission is con-
tained in the appendix; here we shall discuss the important features that should 
guide a detailed reading. To the surprise of no one, the agreement was highly 
favorable to employees. The basic wage increase of 39%, retroactive to January 1 
1972, was significantly higher than the 22.1% inflation of 1971 (although in 
March, when the agreement was reached, the pace of inflation was four times 
that of 1971, and prices had risen 34% from those of March, 1971—the benefit 
of three months1 hindsight made the 39% figure less imposing). Fringe benefits 
were also quite generous, even though limited to the most conventional subjects. 
Textile workers were defined as including both empleados and obreros. 
Some minor distinctions were later made, but the agreement generally treated 
the two categories as one, the term traba.j adores (workers) used to embrace both 
empleados and obreros. Although the distinction was not entirely erased, this 
met the aspirations of the blue-collar workers resentful of the traditional 
division. 
The agreement made a fundamental exception in the opening section: the 
companies intervened or requisitioned would not be covered by the terms of the 
Tripartite Commission's agreement. Those textile firms of the fledgling Area 
Social, large firms which together employed about 20,000 workers, were left to 
a separate bargaining arrangement. VThile it tended to overcome the fragmenting 
structure and the empleado-obrero distinction, therefore, the new system divided 
textile workers into two great blocs: those in the private sector covered by 
the Tripartite Commission's agreement (about 50,000 workers), and those in the 
Area Social (about 20,000). Some of the implications of this division are dis-
cussed in Appendix 1. 
Despite the agreement's assertion that it sets maximum wages and condi-
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tions obligatory for the entire private sector of the textile industry, it is 
actually a flexible blend of maximum and minimum terms. It must be remembered 
that the tripartite agreement did not appear until April, 1972. Sixty unions 
and employers had already gone ahead and negotiated a 1972 agreement, since there 
was no guarantee the Tripartite Commission would produce one. Those that had 
reached an agreement with terms superior to those of the Commission's agreement 
(approximately 35 firms) were allowed by the Commission to maintain their su-
periority. Those that had reached an inferior agreement (approximately 25), 
those who had not yet made a 1972 agreement (at least 250) and those smaller, 
non-union firms that had never bargained collectively (approximately 1,250, 
excluding the thousands of home shops) had to accept the Commission's determi-
nations.* Especially among the latter, however, even a 39% raise would leave 
wages extremely low. The Commission therefore set minimum wages for every oc-
cupation in the industry in order to ensure a floor that each worker could stand 
* A sample of 41 out of the total of 62 bargaining agreements negotiated 
prior to the Tripartite Commission's agreement show the following relationship 
between firm size and wage and benefit levels relative to those of the Commis-
sion's agreement: 
Number of workers in firm 
Number of firms 
with wages and 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 
benefits equal 
or superior to 
those of the Com- - 1 3 6 9 
missions' agree-
ment. 
Number of firms 
with lower wages 1 6 5 2 2 2 - 1 8 
and benefits. 
Source: Archives of the Directorate of Labor 
Other figures in the text are calculated by comparing this sample with the num-
ber of bargaining agreements made in the textile industry in 1971 (315), and the 
total number of textile firms (1,526 excluding home shops). 
200-499 500+ Total 
3 1 23 
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on. That is, the 39% figure served generally as a maximum for firms—the 
majority of those where bargaining previously took place—that had not yet 
reached a 1972 settlement. The job-by-job rates, though, served as minimum 
wages and overruled the 39% where the latter would result in wages below the 
indicated minimum level, the case in most of the smaller firms where bargaining 
had never taken place. 
Flexibility was also served by the Commission's tolerance of fringe 
benefits not contemplated in the tripartite agreement. It limited the increase 
of existing benefits to 39%, but made no attempt to eliminate them or prohibit 
new ones from being negotiated at the plant level. This allowed those workers 
who may have felt stifled by the 39% wage ceiling to seek satisfaction in novel 
benefits from their individual employer. No one on the Commission was pleased 
by this result, but considered it preferable to a resentful rank-and-file which 
neither employers nor the FENATEX desired. At the same time, the relatively 
few benefits included in the tripartite agreement were an enormous contribution 
to the workers in the hundreds of small firms who had never bargained collectively 
and enjoyed no benefits whatsoever. 
A fourth outstanding feature of the tripartite agreement was its sliding-
scale allowance for differences in firm size. Minimum wages in the clothes-making 
sector were cut 10% for firms with ten or fewer workers, except those that had 
previously bargained collectively. Nearly half of the more than 700 clothes-
r o 
making firms fell into this category. In the same way, the agreement provided 
for proportionally lower fringe benefits for those firms where benefits had not 
previously existed. Furthermore, in those firms where the 39% hike would still 
not bring wages up to the minimum level, so that the latter took effect—again, 
this would include most of the small firms—employers were excused from making 
the increase retroactive. 
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Such a differentiation was not made when it came to union dues. The agree-
ment required the same dues payment from all workers in the industry to the FENATEX 
and the CUT, whatever their wage, regardless of their membership in a union, in 
the FENATEX, or in the CUT. The amount was small—roughly .03% of the 
average minimum wage. With approximately 50,000 workers paying it, though, 
these dues represented a significant financial boost to the FENATEX and the 
CUT.* 
A final feature of the agreement reached by the textile Tripartite Com-
mission was the extent and complexity of the minimum wage scheme. Eight sec-
tors of the industry were isolated—cotton, wool, silk, etc.*—and more than 
three hundred jobs distinguished. Only in the largest plants, most of which 
were now in the Area Social, !had unions and employers bargained with such a 
degree of specificity. Moreover, the tripartite agreement established, for 
some sectors, job categories grouping several jobs under an equal wage—a 
refinement that even the largest firms had not previously reached. 
* The dues provision allows an individual worker to exempt himself from dues 
payment by sending letters expressing, such a desire to the Minister of Labor, 
the FENATEX and (where applicable) his union. The relative insignificance of 
the amount compared to the problems it entails makes such self-exemption extremely 
unlikely. 
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9) Post-Agreement Issues 
A. Notification 
With an agreement finally reached, the Commission now turned to the 
problem of notifying the thousands of employers and employees affected by it. 
Much groundwork had already been laid, through the issuance of circulars and 
newsletters announcing the negotiation by the FENATEX, the instituto Textil, and 
the AMPICH to their membership. As we have seen, however, their members amounted 
to a minority of both firms and workers. There were thousands more employers 
and workers, especially in the small, non-union workshops , who knew little or 
nothing about the process of negotiation. For these, straight newspaper publicity, 
plus the textile "grapevine"—workers in their neighborhoods who know other 
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textile workers (remember that they are 10% of the entire industrial work-
force, and most of them are in Santiago); small employers who meet casually to 
discuss common problems, etc. — were the chief vehicles for notification. 
Commission members agreed that they were probably very effective means, and 
felt that most employers and employees in the textile private sector were 
aware of the Tripartite Agreement within a short time of its achievement. 
B. Local Agreements 
An indication of widespread knowledge of the Agreement lay in the in-
crease of firm-level actas de avenimiento, the written agreements between an 
employers and the firm's union or comite de pliego. From less than HOO actas 
in both 1970 and 1971, the number of 1972 actas rose to over 1,000. Since 
the Tripartite Agreement allowed a firm's workers to negotiate particular bene-
fits not treated in tripartite bargaining, workers and employers continued their 
firm-by-firm bargaining. In addition to the national agreement, therefore, each 
firm that had formerly bargained still had its own acta de avenimiento. The 
opening clause of most of these actas , though, was the acceptance of the Commis^ 
sion's determinations in all matters dealt with in the Tripartite Agreement. 
Both the increase in the total number of actas, plus the increased proportion 
of smaller, non-union shops, all of which took the Tripartite Agreement as the 
starting point for their private dealing, suggested a general knowledge of the 
Agreement. 
The same facts also indicated a tendency toward compliance with the 
Agreement on the part of textile employers. It must be remembered, however, 
that compliance could be partial. Commission members admitted that workers 
and employers in many individual firms, especially the small ones, would pro-
bably read just the Agreement to suit themselves, though consenting publicly to 
adhere to the Agreement. In firms where there was more of a family relationship 
75 
than an employer-employee relationship, for example, or where all the workers 
were always paid the same amount, the minimum wages laid down in the Tripartite 
Agreement for different jobs would probably be modified. 
C. Local Fringe Benefits 
There were a few open cases of non-compliance, but these fell on the 
up side of the agreement. For example, one three hundred-worker, highly capi-
talized and efficient, foreign owned firm reached an acta de avenimiento with 
its union on August 6, nearly four months after the Tripartite Agreement, with 
wages and benefits far above those of the latter. It did not even mention the 
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Tripartite Commission. Commission members admitted that they had no intention 
of forcing the agreement on a firm where neither employer nor employees - es-
pecially the latter - wanted it. In general, however, the Tripartite Agreement 
was favorable enough that workers willingly embraced it. 
A survey of post-Tripartite Agreement actas de avenimiento confirms the 
tenanciousness of workers' desires for fringe benefits, and their determination 
to take advantage of the Commission's allowance o'f firm-level bargaining about 
additional matters not covered in the Tripartite Agreement. As in the traditional 
bargaining process, the amount of extra benefits grew proportionally with firm 
size. Those with less than ten workers, for example, averaged less than five 
subjects in addition to the acceptance of the Tripartite Agreement - most of 
them quite rudimentary, such as that wages shall be handed over in an envelope. 
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Firms with two or three hundred workers, on the other hand, elaboraged an acta 
with twenty to forty extra clauses. These extra benefits rivaled the tradition-
al ones in variety and ingenuity, including, for example, money from the em-
ployer for an employees' picnic for sports and culture, for a Christmas show; 
for fixing the bathrooms, for free lunch milk, overalls or work dresses to 
each employee; and usually a broad scheme of benefits in kind and discounts 
on purchases of the firm's product. 
D. Bargaining Overlap 
The momentum of the firm-by-firm bargaining mentality was also indicat-
ed by evidence of bargaining even about subjects covered by the Tripartite 
Commission. In one forty-worker firm, for example, the acta de avenimiento — 
after acknowledging acceptance of the Tripartite Agreement — went on to say, 
in the next clause, that "for strictly personal considerations, and not in 
relation to his functions, the wages received by Juan Rodriguez shall be equi-
valent to those received by an operator of a fuller." A twenty-five worker 
firm's acta stipulated the following; also after taking the Tripartite Agree-
ment : 
It is agreed that in case pieceworkers, although 
they work at normal speed, do not surpass the 
minimum salary established in the Tripartite 
Agreement, the employer and the union, by com-
mon agreement, shall seek a system that will 
solve this anomaly without requiring discharge 
of employees and without harming production.60 
Most of this overlapping bargaining, however, did not contradict the Commission's 
determinations; it rather amplified them, or adjusted them to the customary prac-
tices of the firm. 
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E. Post-Agreement Strikes 
A significant effect of the agreement, and one which reflected impor-
tant political aspects of the new bargaining process (and also is another indi-
cation of general compliance) , was the notable drop of strike activity in the 
textile industry's private sector. From an average of thirty-four strikes by 
obreros per year among textile firms currently in the private sector for the 
period 1968-1971 (forty-two in 1971), the number of 1972 strikes dropped to 
twelve in a year that overall strike activity increased,* Commission members 
attributed this drop to three causes: 1) the discipline being exercised by 
the Communist and Socialist leadership of the FENATEX upon its bases, 2) the 
general inability of the extreme leftist Revolutionary Workers to secure a 
following among the textile rank-and-file, and 3) acceptance of the agreement 
on the part of workers not associated with the FENATEX. 
F. Membership of Bargaining Parties 
The last point tended to diminish in importance as membership in the 
FENATEX continued to grow. FENATEX officials expected to have 50,000 members 
by the end of 1972, compared with approximately 30,000 at the beginning of 
the year. 20,000 of its members would be in the Area Social, but the 
remaining 30,000 would constitute a majority of the workers in the private 
sector. Most of the new workers came from smaller, newly-organized shops 
spurred by the government's pro-union stance and by the fact that the FENATEX 
now negotiated their labor agreement. Increased membership from this sector, 
however, carried possibly harmful political consequences for the Communist and 
Socialist leadership of the FENATEX—consequences discussed in the concluding 
section of this study. 
*See tables on p. 
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Membership in employers' federations was also rapidly increasing. The 
Instituto Textil expected to more than double its membership in 1972—from 135 
to approximately 300. Most of these new members would come from among firms 
in the 20-100 employees range, in contrast to the large firms that formerly 
made up the bulk of the IT. Voting power within the IT was apportioned 
according to capital, however, so the large firms would most likely continue 
to dominate the organization. Among small firms with less than twenty employees, 
membership in the AMPICH was likewise increasing. The number of such member 
63 firms was also more than doubling: from 391 in 1971 to over 800 in 1972. 
What this meant, in terms of the new collective bargaining structure, was that 
the bargaining parties—the FTX, the IT and AMPICH—would in the future represent 
the majority of the employers and employees covered by subsequent agreements.* 
G. Contract Administration 
An important and novel development in textile labor relations under 
the tripartite arrangement was the introduction of agreement administration by 
the bargaining parties. As discussed in section 3, the traditional bargaining 
process channeled all disputes that arose under collective agreements to the 
labor courts or the Directorate of Labor. Save for the exceptional (and 
thoroughly illegal) situation in the leather and shoe industry, there were 
no formalized internal grievance procedures in Chilean labor relations. Decree 
825, however, which regulated the tripartite bargaining process, authorized the 
*It is impossible to distinguish the degree to which these membership growths 
are due exclusively to the new bargaining process. As mentioned earlier, the 
AMPICH was known to have close ties with UP parties. Many new members have 
probably joined to take advantage of this relationship. The Institute Textile, 
on the other hand, grouped the larger firms and probably attracted new members 
looking for powerful allies. The growth of FENATEX membership coincides to 
an overall increase in unionization and federal organization of labor. In 
general, the period since the UP came to power has been marked by an increase 
of membership in all private associations in Chile, most of them aligned (or 
divided into faction) either with or against the government, seeking its 
help or seeking to defned themselves against what they perceive as a threat. 
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Tripartite Commissions to "interpret the meaning and scope" of their own 
agreements. The initial efforts of the textile Tripartite Commission in this 
matter provided some fascinating insights into firm level problems and the 
way a written agreement can never comprehend all the possible issues that will 
arise under it. These efforts also demonstrated the limited capacity of such 
a centralized dispute settlement mechanism. 
During the first six months of the Tripartite Agreement's existence 
(May-October, 1972), approximately sixty interpretation petitions came to the 
textile Commission, which continued to meet twice weekly, containing about one 
hundred issues that required settlement (in the same period, by way of contrast, 
five petitions came to the more homogenous Printing Industry's Tripartite 
Commission). Slightly less than tx<ro-thirds of the petitions came from 
employers. Of the remaining one-third, almost all came from unions. There 
was no set procedure; many of the "hearings" were conducted by telephone by 
the Commission's government representative, charged with getting the facts 
straight. The Commission as a whole made its decision upon his presentation 
of the issue. 
A small number of petitions raised important issues about who was 
covered by the Agreement. Makers of vegetable fibers, for example, wondered 
whether they were included in the Agreement's jurisdiction, since they did 
not fall into one of the sectors enumerated by the Commission. Manufacturers 
of medical products like gauze and tape asked to be excluded. Clothesmakers 
even argued that they were excluded, despute the Agreement's definition, 
because the Decree creating the Commission only said "the textile industry." 
The Commission was acting beyond its powers, they contended, when it included 
clothesmakers. The Tripartite Commission rejected all of these claims, ruling 
that they were all covered by the Agreement. 
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Most of the employers' petitions were in the nature of requests for 
a clearing up of ambiguities in the Agreement—a rule-making decision, as it 
were (e.g.: Are the indemnization provisions applied retroactively in the 
case of workers who retired after January 1, 1972 but before April 21, the 
date of the Tripartite Agreement?). Most of the workers' petitions, on 
the other hand, amounted to complaints and demands for an adjudication (e.g. 
Worker X works half-time on a job that pays 6.50/hr., and half-rtime on another 
job that pays 5.50/hr. The boss pays her 5.50/hr. for her entire work. Tell 
him to pay her equal to 6.00/hr.) 
Many of the problems requiring both rule-making and adjudication derived 
from the impossibility of covering every job in the industry, despite the 
Commission's herculean—and relatively successful—efforts to do so. Many 
employers and unions wrote to the Commission describing a particular task or 
series of tasks performed by a worker. Employers wanted to know where the 
worker fit; the union usually complained that the worker was paid lower than 
the rate for equivalent work signalled in the agreement. After wrestling with 
these job-definition problems for four months, the Commission in early September, 
1972 decided to send all such cases to the local Inspectorate of Labor, 
traditionally responsible for enforcing labor laws, Other issues requiring 
adjudication were also referred to the Inspectorate. The Commission sought 
to limit its interpretation function to broad issues of a rule-making nature. 
Nonetheless, much of the Commission's rule-making function continued 
to be exercised through the adjudication of particular disputes. One employer, 
for example, gave his workers a free lunch, under the terms of a prior acta 
de avenimiento—still valid for subjects not covered by the Tripartate Agreement. 
He wanted to substitute the paid half-hour lunch period, required by Article 7 
of the Agreement, for the free lunch. Considering the free lunch a "prior 
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conquest" that cannot be retracted, the Commission ruled in favor of the workers. 
In another case, a retiring employee had a right to indemnization under 
Article 11. During his final three months of employment, however—the base 
period for determining the amount to be paid—he had been out sick, receiving 
a minimal wage. The employer wanted to base the indemnization on that wage; 
the employee, through his union's petition to the Tripartite Commission, 
wanted the payment to be based on the higher wage rate of his last three 
months of actual work in the plant. The Commission ruled for the worker, 
interpreting Article 11 to mean the last three months' in-plant work. 
Establishing these kinds of "prior conquest" and "in-plant work" rules 
is the principle feature of the Commission's agreement administration work. 
In some cases, however, it also acts as a mediator rather than a rule-maker or 
judge. One firm had reached an acta de avenimiento with its employess on 
December 31, 1971, the day before it would have otherwise fallen under much 
of the Tripartite agreement's coverage. Employees wanted to know if they were 
frozen into that acta. The Commission responded that they were indeed, according 
to the language of the Agreement, but encouraged the union and employer to 
renegotiate some issues to come in line with the terms of the Tripartite 
Agreement. In a dispute about the base rate for payment to union leaders for 
time spent on union business, the Commission told the parties to settle the 
problem themselves, since "in this respect a solution depends principally on 
the good faith that should prevail in worker-employer relations." 
In this mixed bag of rule-making, adjudication and mediation, the 
embryonic stages of labor agreement administration—the first to b e — 
legally established in Chile was taking shape. A great deal of refinement 
was yet to be made. The transfer of most individual disputes to the Inspectorate 
of Labor, for example, was a concession to the pressure of volume that could 
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cause problems. Procedures in the Inspectorate were slow, and conflicts might 
arise due to individual differences among Inspectores. Some kind of internal 
arbitration process might have had to be instituted in order to ensure a 
consistent industry-wide grievance settlement procedure that paralleled the 
new bargaining structure. The procedures for presenting a petition to the 
Commission and for making a decision would probably be regularized, with 
provisions for a hearing, for a fact-finding process etc. to replace the 
presently informal procedure. All of this is speculation, however, and there 
may be forces at work that will prevent such developments. Some of these 
forces are discussed in the concluding section on the long-range implications 
of the new bargaining structure. 
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10) Long-term I ssues 
A. Sectorial Committees 
The textile Tripartite Commission continued to meet at least twice 
weekly following the original agreement. In addition, the Commission created 
sectorial committees consisting of workers and employers of the various 
sectors who discussed the problems peculiar to their sector. The chief 
responsibility of these committees was the elaboration of piecework rates, 
a subject the Tripartite Commission had left for later determination. In 
an industry characterized by infinitely varied differences in capitalization, 
efficiency, productivity, etc. among different firms — much of them based 
in minute differences of machine parts and performance capacities — this 
was a task of formidable complication. 
Employee and government representatives on the Commission were hope-
ful that the sectorial committees would be able to distinguish jobs and 
machine capacities with sufficient clarity to establish standard piece-
work rates. The principle of equal pay for equal work required nothing less, 
they argued. Employer representatives were pessimistic about the possibility 
of making such a piecework system workable. Even if one could be formulated 
on paper, they thought, it would be impossible to police it. They cooperated 
. . 66 in the attempted formulation, however, if only to prove its unworkability. 
B. The Role of the Commission 
The Tripartite Commission acted as a coordinating body, ratifying or 
modifying recommendations of the sectorial committees to bring them in line 
with one another. At the same time, it continued its work of agreement 
administration. Interpretation petitions were constantly arriving as con-
fusions , misunderstandings and grievances arose from the application of the 
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agreement. The Commission had to flesh out the framework it had erected 
with the agreement by its decisions in these interpretation issues. 
In its first post-agreement stages, therefore, the bargaining process 
became characterized by its continual operation — twice-weekly meetings of 
the Commission — and its dual purpose -- administering the existing agree-
ment while simultaneously negotiating on issues not treated in the agreement. 
It appeared that for the near future the Commission would continue these 
activities. The need for further administration remained; it would even 
grow with the complications of the soon-to.-appear piecework rates. Most 
important, however, was the need to collectively confront the broader 
economic difficulties besetting Chile. This need was most acute, because 
it went to the very heart of the bargaining process, the survival of the 
Commission itself. 
C. The Inflation Problem 
The economic problem faced by the Tripartite Commission was how to 
deal with the inflation that plagued the Chilean economy, especially the 
drastic price rises of August and September, 1972. After its price limita-
tion and wage hikes of 1971, the government faced the inevitable conse-
quences of dramatically increased consumer demand and the problems of short-
ages, hoarding and black marketing that it engendered. Demand had to be 
limited. The only options were rationing, price rises and/or wage controls. 
Rationing was considered by many in the UP as politically unacceptable — 
it had become a dirty word, so often had the opposition predicted that socialism 
meant rationing. Establishment of rationing would give the opposition a 
political trump card for the 1973 elections. Instead, the government opted 
for price rises, a measure more failiar to Chileans, for whom substantial 
inflation had become a way of life.* In an unusual step, however, the 
*The government did institute selective rationing in January, 1973. 
85 
government also sought for the first time to impose wage limits on unionized 
workers. 
From the 22.1% inflation of 1971 — a relatively low rate, compared 
to the 30% average of the previous years — government controlled prices 
rose 99.8% by September, 1972, and continued to 130.2% at the end of 
October. The government's wage policy, the only one it could undertake 
after its years in opposition demanding reajustes equal to the rise of the 
cost-of-living, amounted to precisely that: the passage of an early reajuste 
that would recapture the workers' lost buying power. During October, therefore 
a reajuste of 99.8% (based on inflation figures to September) was passed. 
Traditionally, reajuste laws had excluded from coverage workers with 
collective agreements. Part of this new law, however, dealt with workers 
with collective bargaining agreements, and gave them the following option: 
either to take the 99.8% reajuste, which would fix their wages at the new 
level that resulted until September, 1973; or to wait until their current 
agreement expired and negotiate freely a new agreement with their employer. 
Those workers with an agreement that expired in October or November could 
conceivably hold out and make a new deal, based on the cost-of-living 
rise at the date of expiration. Most workers, however, had agreements 
that would expire much later. Already squeezed by the inflation up to 
September, they ncessarily had to opt for the 99.8% increase; that is, they 
obtained wage increases equal to the cost rise, but could not bargain for 
a higher figure. 
This is the point where the government's wage-boosting labor policy 
collided with its wage-restraining economic policy. On one hand, the UP 
had pushed the formation of large, pwerful industry-wide unions through the 
creation of the tripartite commissions. In the negotiations, these new 
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industry-wide bargaining units could obtain higher wages, wages well above 
the reajuste figure. Now, however, the government was seeking to hold the 
wages of these workers to the reajuste, withdrawing their latitude to nego-
tiate above that figure. 
This policy was announced with a large-scale publicity campaign 
emphasizing the point that the 99.8% reajuste equalled the inflation rise 
for the period January-September, 1972, in contrast to the below-cost 
reajustes of former governments. Still, by attempting to put a one-year 
hold on this new wage level.while inflation continued rampant (even for 
Chile) beyond September, the government threatened to cut even further into 
the workers' buying power. 
The opposition — Christian Democrats and conservatives who during 
their periods of government sought to hold wages Of public and unorganized 
workers below the cost-of-living rise — now jumped on this policy, accusing 
the government of choking the organized workers' right to freely negotiate 
a collective agreement. The government responded, first, that the opposi-
tion was in no position to accuse anyone of restraining workers' wages, and 
second, that such a policy would in the long run slow inflation, since it 
tended to prevent organized workers from negotiating an agreement above the 
cost-of-living rise, which they had generally been able to do in the past. 
Nonetheless, the risks of this policy are evident. Would organized workers 
be satisfied with simply meeting the cost-of-living rise, rather than staying 
slightly ahead of it as they were previously able to do? Would they seek 
to avoid the wage-freezing effects of the fixed 99.8% rise by negotiating new 
and higher fringe benefits? Would the general restraint on bargaining latitude 
generate resentment among union leaders, despite their affiliation with the 
government parties? Would Christian Democratic and Revolutionary Worker 
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elements gain ground, and possibly even positions of leadership, in the 
formerly reliable blue-collar unions? 
Perhaps most problematical of all was the question of what to do if 
inflation continued its dizzy rise — as October figures indicated it was 
doing. The 99.8% wage hike was fixed for a one year period, until September 
30, 1973. No new wage agreements could be negotiated until then, except 
by the few unions who could afford to wait for their agreements to expire in 
October or November, 1972. If inflation continued at its rapid pace, even 
September, 1972's reajuste would be eaten away to an inadequate level. 
Demands for relief would rise up from the rank-and-file workers, Either 
the government would have to sponsor a new reajuste before the September 
'73 term it had set — a virtual admission of defeat of its wage-price 
policy or unions would go ahead and negotiate increases despite the law, 
either in open defiance or in clandestine dealing for "black wages", 
which would amount to the same defeat. 
The time factor was also important. Congressional elections were 
set for March, 1973. If wages were being squeezed by continued price rises 
at that time, without the relief of a reajuste the UP would risk losing support 
in its working-class base. Waiting would also undermine the prestige 
UP labor leaders to the advantage of Christian Democratic and Revolutionary 
Worker elements. If the reajuste came before the elections, on the other 
hand, the opposition's charges of the government's inability to manage the 
economy would gain acceptance among the middle class sectors sought as allies 
by the UP. Even if it came early, moreover, another attempt to hold the wages 
of unionized workers to the reajuste would also play into the hands of 
DC and FTR forces in the unions. Continued inflation, therefore, would 
not only squeeze workers' buying power. It would force the UP into an 
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excruciating political position. 
D. The Commission's Response 
The Tripartite Commission followed the wage policy embodied in the 
new reajuste law. In its initial experience with the Commission, the 
FENATEX had obtained a very favorable agreement, one with a wage increase 
above the previous twelve months' inflation figure. Now textile wages were 
tied to the reajuste. Wages set in the original agreement were raised 
99.8% in October, and fixed for a term of one year, until September 30, 
1973. In effect, therefore, there was no real bargaining. There was a 
new agreement, but adopted entirely in conformance with the reajuste 
law. The original agrement had lasted six months. 
Government and labor representatives hoped that such a policy was 
only a temporary response to an extraordinary situation. Even if it had to 
be maintained, however, they asserted that: 1) the upward levelling of 
wages in the small, formerly low-paying shops, the chief concrete accomplish-
ment of the original agreement, would be preserved, and 2) the political 
consciousness of the textile workers and the authority of the FENATEX 
among them would forestall a rank-and-file revolt against the agreement 
and the loss of union leadership to Christian Democratic and FTR activists. 
The Commission could also continue its work of agreement administration, which 
contributed to a standardization of work practices and a corresponding 
reduction of arbitrariness and discrimination in worker-boss relations. 
The work of the sectorial committees could clear up problems that arose 
from differences among the various sectors of the industry. In other words, 
there were a number of beneficial features to the new bargaining system 
that could be maintained even where the parties' wage-setting latitude -
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11) Conclusions 
The textile Tripartite Commission passed the initial stage of operation 
with fair success and prospects of continued institutional viability. The 
fragmented, firm-by-firm traditional collective bargaining structure was replaced 
by an industry-wide structure. Each of the parties developed a positive interest 
in the new process — fewer strikes, coordination between the public and private 
sectors of the industry, cooperation to avoid nationalization and encourage 
favorable price and tax policies from the government, etc. A formal process 
of agreement administration, although still rudimentary, took shape — not 
simply interpretation of agreement language, but a method of continued nego-
tiation over issues not squarely dealt with in the agreement. There was an 
overall adjustment to the new process, a shift by the various parties toward 
new goals, perceptions, expectations, sympathies, skills, etc. required by 
the widened bargaining structure. 
Despite these developments, a number of political and economic pressures 
on the work of the Commission brought into question its survival, not as an 
institution, but as a true collective bargaining forum. This problem in turn 
reflected the difficult position of the new government, caught in a bind 
between conflicting economic and labor policies. 
Which would prevail: the wage-restraining policy that would encourage 
a surplus for social uses, or the strong-union, high-wage policy that would 
shrink the surplus? The former would permit the government to bring inflation 
under control, ease the shortage crisis, and develop some of its social programs 
all results that would gather support among the population at large. In the 
organized labor sector, however, a restraint on the newly-found collective 
bargaining strength of industry-wide unions like the FENATEX would undermine 
the leadership of UP union officers and drive rank-and-file unionists ~- the 
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UP's main source of electoral support — into the arms of Christian Democratic 
and Revolutionary Worker challengers. 
There was no guarantee, furthermore, that even the strong-union labor 
policy would not also shift leadership strength to Christian Democrats and 
Revolutionary Workers, especially the former. The new collective bargaining 
units included formerly unorganized workers. FENATEX membership, for example, 
was rising from 30,000 to 50,000 members in 1972. Most of the new members 
came from small, non-union shops who lacked the experience of struggle that 
cemented the ties of organized workers to the UP parties. These new members 
were probably susceptible to Christian Democratic influence (already the third 
force in the FENATEX — see election results, p. 53), both for the Christian 
content of its position, which found a response among unorganized workers, and 
because the Christian Democrats could, afford a higher-wage stance than the UP 
union leaders, who still had the responsibility to try to induce self-restraint 
on wages. 
At their most extreme, the long-run effects of the new bargaining structure 
may have amounted to a form of self-destruction on the part of the UP. By 
encouraging the development of industry-wide union organization and industry-
wide bargaining, the government might have strengthened the FENATEX to such a 
point that it no longer needed the traditional legislative protection of the 
socialist political parties; it could take care of itself on a purely trade-
unionist level. It was the sindical weakness of Chilean unions that forced 
them to build ties with the Communist and Socialist parties. If a strong, 
industry-wide union like the FENATEX could be developed, these parties might 
become superfluous for its economic protection. 
In the same way, on the national scale the sharp increase in the overall 
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level of unionization, the breaking down of the old obrero-empleado dis-
69 tinction, the extension of agrarian reform and the growth of peasant unions, 
the increased participation of the established union hierarchy in government 
policy-making are all structural changes that strengthen the sindical hand 
of the working class. As with the new structure of collective bargaining in 
the textile industry, however, these phenomena may contain contradictory elements 
harmful to the socialist political forces. 
Much of the new unionization takes place among white-collar and 
professional workers sympathetic to the middle class-based Christian Democratic 
71 Party. There are signs that the outdated de jure distinction betv;een obrero 
and empleado is being replaced by a de_ facto skilled worker-unskilled worker 
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division that will cut into union cohesiveness and solidarity. The peasants 
in their new unions are traditionally open to the Christian Democrats' religious 
appeal. The presence of CUT leaders in high councils of government could result 
in increased bureaucratism and loss of contact with the bases. The Christian 
Democrats' own proposals for workers' management in the Area Social are openly 
designed to play on the workers' traditional bread-and-butter tendencies, 
73 implying that each worker will become a miniature capitalist. 
In other words, the complex of forces operating in the Chilean labor scene 
tend to work to the Christian Democrats' advantage, even though it is the UP 
that provided the impulse to put these forces in motion. In effect, the UP 
is paying the price of its election: rewarding the working class base with 
reforms that lead to bigger, stronger unions when weak unions, in need of legis-
lative protection, were the very condition of the UP's successful political 
campaign. 
Some loss of political support among workers to the Christian Democrats 
is probably inevitable. It is not certain, however, that strong unions would cauSi 0. 
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decisive shift of support away from the UP parties. Unions will be strong in 
comparison to their former fragmented weakness, but they will still be operating 
in a context of extensive social legislation, welfare protections, wage and 
price controls, etc. vital to their interests, which will demand a union voice 
in the legislative sphere. Both the pressure of tradition and loyalty, as 
well as the fact that a middle class-based party like the Christian Democratic 
Party could not sustain pro-union policies for long, will probably keep the bulk 
of organized labor tied to the Communist and Socialist parties. 
The ideal solution for the UP would be self-restraint on the part of the 
organized workers, conscious of their revolutionary responsibility to sacri-
fice immediate benefits in order to progress toward socialism. UP politicians, 
and union leaders as well, talk about the need to develop such a consciousness. 
But as long as power within the unions is subject to internal electoral democracy, 
however, as is required by law, it can remain just talk. UP union leaders 
still have to get high wages and the UP parties have to accept this result if 
both are to retain the support of union members. 
There is another, less ideal solution to the dilemma: taking undemocratic 
control of the unions and forcing wage restraints on otherwise unwilling union 
members by having union officers "negotiate" lower wages. Such a development, 
however, could only take place in a context of a shift away from electoral 
democracy in Chile as a whole. An attempt to eliminate union elections in the 
present context would be roundly resisted by rank-and-file unionists, who would 
express their displeasure by voting for opposition political candidates and by 
forming rival unions .and federations. The UP would become an isolated and in-
effectual minority in both general politics and in its traditional union base. 
What should the UP do? It if were certain that the creation of strong 
unions would lose the UP its labor support in any case for the reasons described 
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earlier, it might then go ahead with a wage-restraint policy, hoping that the 
expanded and improved social services resulting from that policy would win it 
a broader-based source of support — a coalition of peasants, unorganized 
workers, government employees and middle class progressives who either benefit 
from or identify with such social service programs. 
As argued above, it is not certain that the balance of organized labor 
political support would shift to the Christian Democrats with the establish-
ment of strong unions. Furthermore, the UP has to consider whether the above-
mentioned coalition would be sufficient to make up the 14% the UP fell short of 
a majority in the 1970 elections, without the solid bloc of union supporters 
that were the key to the 1970 victory. The UP will need a majority in the 1976 
elections, since the Opposition is sure to run a united campaign against it. 
Should the UP give up its base in the unions for the uncertainty of the coali-
tion described above? 
Probably not. For one thing, the heart of the UP reform program is the 
creation of the Area Social. Union support for the Area Social is critical for 
its continued viability, and an attempt to cut into union strength would turn 
workers against it.1-' 
Even more basically, foresaking the organized working class, even with its 
high-wage aspirations and other bad habits and values left over from a century 
of capitalist exploitation, would run counter to the UP's own traditions and 
to the theory of socialist revolution that underlies the UP's activities. The 
UP is a coalition of labor parties. It cannot suddenly transform itself into 
a motley coalition of parties representing other groups in society without 
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becoming a farcical traitor to the group that put it in power. Furthermore, 
if a socialist revolution should be led by the most conscious, experienced 
and reliable portion of the working class, then revolutionary parties should 
stay with that portion, whatever temporary difficulties should inhere. 
It is ironic that Chile elected a socialist government due to the weakness 
of the Chilean working class; i.e., its sindical weakness, its lack of economic 
muscle that drove workers to build up political strength through the parties 
that comprise the UP. But the struggles that won them political power cannot 
be depreciated. The Chilean workers' efforts are now being rewarded with reforms 
that increase their sindical strength as well as give them a new voice, a new 
influence and a new dignity in national affairs. The UP will have to endure 
continued economic difficulties in order to conserve its working class base. 
Attempts at wage restraint like the September, 1972 law tying union wages 
to the reajuste cannot be sustained without losing union support. This is 
a loss the parties of the UP cannot afford either now, when they must build and 
preserve the Area Social and other basic reform structures, or in the future 
when they must confront new elections, new problems, and possibly new revolu-
tionary situations. For all of these, Chile's revolutionary parties must have 
a base in the organized working class, which must itself be prepared to sacrifice 
and capable of taking over the economy without serious economic dislocations. 
These tasks of preparation and training are the next great challenge for the 
Chilean Left.* 
*This concluding discussion assumes that Chile's institutional stability will be 
maintained through this and future governments. In the opnion of the author, 
the contending forces in Chile are evenly enough matched at present 
that none will attempt an overthrow of established constitutional processes. 
If such an overthrow succeeded, however, it would probably make most of the 
reforms of the UP — like the creation of the tripartite commissions — insti-
tutional dead letters. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Bargaining in the Area Social 
Good relations with small and medium sized employers constitute a basic 
part of the UP's strategy, and the new "bargaining arrangement in the private 
sector is a test of that strategy. This does not mean that collective 
bargaining in the new Area Social is not also critical. An in-depth study of 
collective bargaining, however, cannot be separated from a study of workers' 
participation in the Area Social. This is a subject that limitations of time, 
access and existence of concrete information make difficult for study at the 
present time. Nonetheless, this section will attempt to outline some of the 
developments and indicate some of the problems arising out of the relationship 
between collective bargaining and workers' participation in the textile firms 
of the Area Social. 
At the present time (December, 1972) , seventeen textile firms with more 
than 500 workers are in the Area Social. They employ about 20,000 workers. 
Some smaller firms are also intervened, but they are not intended to stay 
under state control. Intervention and requisition are the principal means used 
by the UP to move a firm to the Area Social. Both are authorized in legislation 
from the 1920's or 30's. Based on legal powers authorized in the Labor Code 
and subsequent legislation, the government can "intervene" a firm where a 
strike compromises national security or the well-being of the population. 
Requisition is the taking over of a firm being mismanaged to the detriment of 
citizens' well-being - price fixing, excessive stockpiling, deliberate under-
production, etc. Strictly speaking, it is supposed to manage the firm on 
behalf of the owners, and return it when the threat is past. But returning 
the firms to private management,is at the discretion of the government. Fol-
lowing intervention, therefore, of one of the firms announced by the UP among 
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the 91 to be nationalized, the government simply keeps on managing it in the 
exercise of its legitimate discretion. 
Most of the textile firms of the Area Social are more modern, productive 
plants that traditionally paid comparatively higher wages. The government 
tries to emphasize that these firms' earnings now serve all the Chilean people 
rather than private interests. In this context, an attempt is made to treat 
the Area Social as an economic unit rather than a coincidental gathering of 
unrelated companies. A government representative on the management team of 
an intervened textile firm argued that: 
We cannot analyze the functioning of these firms in traditional capitalist 
terms. The building of the Area Social implies a different criterion. We 
are not worried about the individual case of each firm, but rather the 
global context of the textile area. It is very possible that some firms, 
for individual reasons, suffer losses, but are compensated by the enormous 
gains of others. That is, we are not interested in profiting, but in 
serving the entire community.76 
In line with the reasoning, the government sought to centralize the collective 
bargaining process in the Area Social and move toward dealing with the nationalized 
firms as a whole. A multi-lateral commission was established, consisting of 
representatives from the Ministries of Labor and of the Economy, from the 
management teams of the firms involved, and from the FENATEX. All the pliegos 
(the list of workers' demands) are sent to this commission, whose goal is to 
bring the wages and benefits of the various firms in line with each other and 
begin negotiating with all the workers in a single negotiating process. 
The commission does not determine the wages, however. It makes a recommendation 
to the union and the management. This recommendation can be accepted or 
rejected; the hope is that the efforts of FENATEX to exercise restraint over 
its bases will be successful in persuading the workers to accept the commission's 
recommendations. 
In its initial efforts, the advisory commission had little success in 
limiting or equalizing textile workers' wages. It also made no progress in 
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developing a pattern of even coordinated collective bargaining, let alone the 
unitary process that is its goal. Workers continued to identify with and 
bargain through their individual firms and unions. A survey of bargaining 
agreements of these firms reveals a strong economist tendency prevailing over 
the revolutionary restraint that the government and the FEMATEX leadership 
try to encourage. Wages continue to be much higher than most of the private 
sector, and benefits are exceeding even the exhaustive supply gained under the 
traditional bargaining arrangement. Benefits in kind are especially prevalent. 
(Many workers are taking advantage of the increased demand by dealing themselves 
in the textiles they obtain as benefits.) Since the government wants to 
make the Area Social a showcase of progressive industrial organization, more-
over, individual firms are providing in-plant medical offices, cultural centers, 
special buses for each firm's workers, etc. 
The government is aware of this economicist tendency and the problems 
it creates for the success of the UP program. In a speech at a CUT demonstra-
tion on July 25, 1972, President Allende insisted: 
It is imperative to put a stop to the economicist attitude in the 
pliegos de peticiones and reajustes .... We must rise above the criteria 
of the past .... It is indispensable to tie wage increases to production 
and productivity.... We cannot have conflicts after an agreement is 
reached.'° 
His words have not been entirely heeded; in October, 1972, a short but bitter 
strike erupted in one of the major national textile firms. After the 
government refused to accede, to their pliego, workers occupied the offices 
of the Comite Textil, the textile branch of the Ministry of the Economy. After 
six days, it ended with the union obtaining most of its demands. 
Communist Party officials make particularly informative observations. Due 
to the Party's position as the dominant force within the UP* and within the 
*PC dominance in the UP cannot be proven, and the Party would never admit it. 
But everyone know it is so. 
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labor movement, including among textile workers, it is especially sensitive to 
the contradictions of the labor relations in the Area Social, On the one hand, 
the Community Party takes the austere line emphasizing restraint, discipline, 
the necessity of relating wages to productivity, etc. On the other hand, it 
doesnot want to risk losing its rank-and-file base to the Christian Democrats 
on the right, or to the Revolutionary Workers on the left, both of whom are 
taking advantage of the circumstances to capture support by elevating wage 
and benefit demands beyond those asked by the predominantly Communist and 
Socialist union leadership. An article by a Community Minister in Principios, 
the theoretical organ of the Communist Party underlines some of the problems 
of the Party's position; and comes down plainly on the need to support 
rank-and-file demands in order to maintain the Party's base: 
In such circumstances, the intentions of Communists to face the question 
of wage demands in a different way, if it does not find a handle in the 
real relations between managers and workers, could be misunderstood by 
many workers and technicians and even, at times, separate our comrades 
from some sectors of the masses. It become indispensable, therefore, 
instead of idealizing the situation, for the Party cells and plant 
committees to take it into account when poor management, exercised in a 
bureaucratic and traditional form and manifested in arbitrariness 
prevents the developments of new channels in which wage increases 
are linked with production. In the face of this problem, workers should 
not be prevented from trying to obtain increases through a conflict, 
just as before, with management and with a State that appears to them 
as the successor of the old boss,- Without falling into the opportunism 
of those who raise these old arguments, Communists should support the 
workers1 wage demands, in the struggle against mistakes and for an 
authentic participation. '" 7 'fL-
The need for the UP to bend to the economicist tendencies of its labor 
support is not hard to understand. For decades, the workers' parties, 
especially the Communist and Socialist parties, fought hardest for pro-labor 
reforms and for defense of the workers' standard of living. Textile workers' 
union leadership - mostly Communist and Socialist militants - could act 
perfectly consistently as both trade union officials and party members. 
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Those parties owe their electoral victory to precisely the organized workers 
whose economicist aspirations the parties and their labor leaders so strongly 
supported. 
It is impossible, now, to turn the current of those decades of economicist 
collaboration toward restraint and sacrifice. It is especially difficult in 
80 the Area Social. The success of the UP program depends on its ability to 
put the profits of Chile's large industries to social uses; i.e., on the success 
of the Area Social. The success of the Area Social in turn depends on a 
productive and peaceful — in short, a happy - work force. And to keep the 
workers happy, producing, (and UP supporters-, another important consideration) 
the government finds it necessary to yield to their pressures for increased 
wages and benefits. This cuts into the surplus for social use, contrary to 
the raison d'etre of the Area Social. At the present time, however, the govern-
ment deems it necessary to protect first of all the very survival of the 
Area Social, whose permanence is not legally guaranteed, as a viable, growing 
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and productive sector of the economy. 
The UP is hopeful that economicist tendencies can be overcome through 
increased workers' participation in the productive process. As workers 
take on more responsibility in managing the enterprises, it is felt, they 
will come to make the connections between wages and costs and productivity, 
and limit their demands by conscious self-discipline. In the textile firms 
of the Area Social, the participation programs are most advanced — at least 
on the surface. There is a great deal of controversy about whether there is 
real participation or not. At any rate, the participation organisms are 
established: committees at the shop level ^"Production Committee"), at the 
departmental level ("Coordinating Committee"), and toe central administrative 
level ("Administration Council"). The role of the union in this new context, 
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especially in relation to the participation committees, is a subject of 
heated debate, most of it strong on principles and weak on specifics. 
The union is characterized as the "guiding motor" of the process, the "poli-
85 tical and ideological impulse". Union leaders of the textile firms of the 
Area Social resolved, in a national convention, the following about the role 
of the union: 
1) That the union, in the new political, economic and social context, 
is the orienting motor and conductor of the working class, and at the 
same time a political and ideological educator. 
2) That the union should maintain its independence and autonomy before the 
organisms of participation in a vigilant attitude toward the process as 
representatives of the working class. 
3) That in defense of the class interests and for the favorable changes 
that have been achieved — the nationalization of copper, the creation 
of the Area Social, the nationalization of banks and the extension of 
agrarian reform — the union should be the nerve of agitation on political 
problems, and be alert toward the permanent attacks of imperialism 
and domestic reactionaries. 
4) That given the need to act in an agile and effective way, the union 
should break the bureaucratism of its old outworn structures and main- „, 
tain a permanent attitude of constructive criticism and self-criticism. 
Despite these recommendations, the tendency is for the union to continue its 
traditional task of representing the workers' economic interests. And to 
avoid letting control of unions fall to the Christian Democrats, or losing 
influence to the FTR, the predominantly Communist and Socialist leadership 
of the textile unions has to continue giving priority to bread-and-butter 
issues. For these reasons, collective bargaining in the textile Area Social, 
remains similar to the process of the traditional system, with firm-by-firm 
negotiation and strong economicist pressure from the rank-and-file. V7hether 
the slow growth and enrichment of the participation experience will reverse 
this tendency, it is still to soon to know. 
Appendix 2 
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CONDITIONS QF^WORK AND WAGES FOR THE TEXTILE ACTIVITY 
OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Resolution 
Num.l.-Sangiago, April 20, 1972.- The Tripartite Commission charged with 
fixing obligatory wages and conditions of work for the workers and employers 
who perform their activities directly in the Textile Industry of the Private 
Sector, created by Decree No. 462 of April 4, 1972 of the Ministry of Labor 
and Welfare, by virtue of Article 7 of Law 17.074 of December 31, 1968, has 
determined by the unanimity of its members that the maximum wages and con-
ditions of work in effect for the employers and workers who perform their 
activity directly in the Textile Industry of the Private Sector, for a period 
of one year beginning January 1, 1972, will be the following: 
1) The present resolution is a Collective Agreement which will be in 
effect for the employers and workers of the Textile Activity of the Private 
Sector. 
To this effect, the following definitions are understood: 
A) Textile Industry of the Private Sector: The establishments, factories, 
workshops and sections of establishments of the private sector, which are 
directly engaged in the fabrication and/or production of fiber, thread, yarn, 
cloth, farbic in general; in the manufacturing of clothing, home articles and 
other textiles; in the elaboration and finishing of textiles in general; in 
the fabrication of rugs, tapestries and similar articles and the fabrication 
of articles that contain textile products. 
B) Textile Employers: The owners, employers, managers and juridicial 
persons that perform their activity directly in the Textile Industry. 
C) Textile Workers: The empleados and obreros* that perform their activity 
directly in the textile industry of the private sector, where they are not 
covered by the dispositions of paragraphs II and III of Law 10,621.** 
2) Excepted from coverage by the present resolution are the establishments, 
factories and enterprises of the country's textile industry which at the date 
of this resolution are intervened and/or requisitioned, whether by the Ministry 
of Labor and Welfare or by the Ministry of Economics, 
3) During the term of this resolution there may not be undertaken collective 
conflicts of a social-economic character to modify the conditions of work and 
*Empleados are roughly our equivalent of white-collar workers. Obreros would 
be blue-collar workers. This distinction is extremely important in Chilean 
labor law. See discussion in text, p. /5~" 
**These provisions cover workers engaged in printing and photographic activities. 
A small number of workers in the textile industry do such work, but they are 
members of separate unions. 
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wages contained herein.* 
4) The conditions of work and wages established through collective 
agreements, collective contracts, acts of accord or arbitral decisions in the 
textile industry of the private sector, which are inferior to the minimums 
contained herein, will be overridden by the conditions of work and wages 
contained in this resolution. 
5) The conditions of work and wages agreed upon by the Tripartite 
Commission through the present resolution will be obligatory for all the 
workers and employers of the textile industry of the private sector, who must 
conform to that which is here established. 
6) The collective agreements, collective contracts, acts of accord or 
arbitral decisions currently in effect which contain wages, benefits or 
conditions of work not treated in the present resolution or superior to those 
established here, will.continue "in effect and be readjusted at the end of the 
term of the respective collective agreements, collective contracts, acts of 
accord or arbitral decisions in accordance with the percentage that the 
Tripartite Commission will have established. 
7) All those benefits, perquisites and/or bonuses established in the 
enterprises, stipulated in money sums, not dealt with in this resolution, 
shall automatically be increased 39% dating from January 1, 1972. 
Those benefits, perquisites and/or bonuses stipulated in specie or in 
percentages shall be kept at the same level. 
This clause shall apply only to the collective agreements , collective 
contracts, acts of accord or arbitral decision that expired before January 1, 
1972. 
8) By whatever percentage were increased the wages or conditions of work 
in effect on December 31, 1971, either by the legal reajuste** or by agreement 
between the parties, shall be imputed to the increase contained in this 
agreement. 
9) The empleados of this branch may solicit the benefits of the present 
resolution inasmuch as it applies to them. 
I. CONDITIONS OF WORK 
The conditions of work here established shall apply to all the employers 
and workers of the textile activity of the private sector. 
Art.l) Birth Allowance: A birth allowance of E°200*** is hereby established, 
for the birth of a child of any worker who on December 31, 1971 did not enjoy 
*Underneath the windy language, this is a no-strike clause, plain and simple. 
**The legislatively fixed wage increase to compensate for the effect of inflation. 
See discussion in text, y. If- 2.0 
***E0=EsTudos. 
A 
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this benefit. 
For those workers who on December 31, 1971 enjoyed a birth allowance, 
whatever its amount, the allowance shall be raised 39%, as long as with such 
an increase the allowance remains not less than E°300. 
For the workers who on December 31, 1971 enjoyed an allowance greater than 
E°400, it shall be raised 22.1%. 
Art.2) School Allowance: For the workers who on December 31, 1971 did 
not enjoy this benefit, there shall be authorized a school allowance of E°80 
for each child in primary or secondary school. 
For those who on December 31, 1971 enjoyed this benefit, said benefit 
shall be increased 39%, but the new amount shall not be less than E"120 for 
primary school students or E°150 for secondary students. This allowance shall 
be paid once a year in March upon presentation of the proper certificates of 
registration. For the present year it shall be paid within thirty days of 
the date of this resolution. 
For the children of workers studying in accredited universities the cost 
of matriculation shall be paid.* For workers engaged in university studies, 
the cost of matriculation shall be paid according to the regulation that the 
Tripartite Commission will issue. 
Art.3) Marriage Allowance: In case of marriage of a worker, the following 
allowances shall be paid: 
For those workers who on December 31, 1971 did not enjoy this benefit, 
there shall be paid an allowance of E°200 plus three days1 leave paid by 
the employer and considered as effectively worked for all legal and conventional 
effects. 
In the case of workers who on December 31, 1971 did enjoy this benefit, 
whatever its amount, the allowance shall be raised 39% to a sum not less than 
E°400, with right to five days' leave paid by the employer and considered 
worked for all legal and conventional effects. 
Those workers who enjoyed a marriage allowance but did not have a right 
to paid leave shall receive the foregoing increase and the five days' paid 
leave, considered worked for all legal and conventional effects. 
Art.4) Death Allowance: In case of the death of a worker employed in an 
enterprise, the enterprise shall pay to the nearest relative a funeral cost 
allowance of E°2,000. 
The enterprise shall pay to the worker the sum of E°800 in case of the 
death of one of his or her parents, spouse or ehild. In addition, the worker 
shall have the right to two days' paid leave, considered worked for all legal 
*Universities in Chile are state-supported, and tuition in minimal—about 
the equivalent of one dollar at the official exhcange rate. 
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and conventional effects, where the death occurs in the same province, and 
four days' leave if it occurs outside the province. 
The funeral cost allowances existing on December 31, 1971, whatever their 
amount, shall be raised 39%, but the increased amount shall not be less than 
E°2,000 and E°800 as indicated above. 
Art.5) Holiday Allowance:* There shall be a minimum annual holiday 
allowance of E°240 for those workers who on December 31, 1971 did not enjoy 
this benefit. 
For those workers who on December 31, 1971 did enjoy this benefit, 
whatever its amount, it shall be raised 39%, but the total shall not be less 
than that stipulated above. 
Art.6) Guaranteed Profit Sharing:** Under the rubric of profit-sharing 
the enterprises shall pay to their obrero workers an additional 3% on the 
total of all salaries, incentives, allowances and payments in money during 
the year. This payment shall be made at the time of workers' annual vacation. 
In case of discharge, voluntary retirement, death or legal retirement of 
the worker, the enterprise shall pay the sums that correspond proportionally 
to his or her due, together with all other final wage settlements. 
In those enterprises where there are industrial unions, the union shall 
also receive an additional 3% of all salaries paid. The union shall have 
access to such funds three times per year. 
With the:payment of the percentage indicated in this article, Articles 
405 and following of the Labor Code shall be considered fulfilled. 
Art.7) Lunch Pay: The enterprises shall give a one-half hour paid 
lunch period to their employees, both straight rate and.piece work employees. 
In the case of the latter, the half hour shall be paid at a rate equal to their 
average income of the hours worked. 
Art.8) Advanced Health Subsidy Payment: The enterprises shall make an 
agreement with the National Health Service for the direct payment of the 
subsidies of its workers under the terms of Art.2 of Law 17,443 of July 7, 
1971. The values of the subsidies paid by the enterprises shall be later 
returned by the National Health Service in a form and procedure established 
for this purpose.*** 
*The three holidays on which this allowance is paid are Independence Day 
(September 18), Christmas and Easter. 
**Article 405 of the Labor Code requires employers to share 10% of their profits 
with the "industrial union", if there is a union in their plant. "Industrial 
union" means that the union of obreros in the plant. Most unions, however, 
prefer to negotiate a smaller, guaranteed amount rather than risk an unprofitable 
year. This is what they are doing here. Note that it extends to non-union 
workers as well. 
***Chile has a national health insurance system which includes subsitute wage 
payments to workers absent from work because of illness. Normally, it is the 
Health Service that pays out of a fund that all employers contribute to. Here, 
however, they are agreeing that employers will pay sick workers directly, to avoi 
bureaucratic delays common in the Health Service payment. 
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Art.9) Union Officer's Leave: The enterprises shall grant paid leave, 
considered worked for all legal and conventional effects, to union officers 
carrying out the duties of their office, where it is duly proven. This 
leave shall not exceed twenty-four hours total in one week. In any case, 
one officer shalL.have maximum use of twelve hours in one week, the other 
twelve hours for the use of the other union officers.* 
Those enterprises with from one to ten employees shall grant to the 
members of their industrial committee leave that shall not exceed five hours 
total in one week, to carry out the duties of their office, where it is duly 
proven. 
The enterprises with from eleven to twenty-four employees where there Is 
not a union shall grant leave under the same terms indicated above but for a 
period that shall not exceed ten hours total in one week. 
In those enterprises where a more liberal leave is established, it 
shall continue to be in effect. 
Such leave shall be considered as worked for all legal and conventional 
effects. 
Art.10) Night Work: Night work shall be paid with an increase of 50% 
on the normal rate of the worker's pay. Night work is defined as that which 
begins at 11:00 P.M. or afterward. 
In those enterprises where a night work increase in more favorable to the 
worker than that established here, the former shall continue to be in effect. 
Art.11) Idemnification for Years of Service: The enterprises shall pay 
to their employees an idemnification for years of uninterrupted service in 
the respective enterprise and calculated on the worker's average wage of 
the previous three months of work, according to the following rules: 
a) Those enterprises which at the present date do not have this benefit 
shall pay an indemnification of ten days' pay for each year of service. 
b) Those enterprises which at the present date have benefits of ten to 
fifteen days' pay for each year of service shall pay twenty days' pay for each 
year of service. 
c) Those enterprises which at the present date have benefits of more 
than fifteen days' pay for each year of service shall increase the benefit by 
five days' pay, but the increased amount shall not exceed thirty days' pay 
for each year of service in the enterprise. 
This indemnification shall be paid to all workers discharged by the 
enterprise, as long as the termination of work is not due to one of the causes 
*Unions are required by the Labor Code to have five officers. In non-union 
plants, especially the small ones where unions are prohibited by the Code, 
a "Comite de Industria", also of five members, is elected. 
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established in Numbers 2 and 6 of Article 2 of Law 16,455; that is, duly 
proven dishonesty, bad, insulting or immoral conduct, and repeated absenteeism.* 
To have a right to this benefit the worker must have at least one year's 
seniority in the enterprise. 
The indemnification for years of service shall also be paid to those 
workers who, with accumulated seniority of at least three years, voluntarily 
retire. During the year this agreement is in effect, voluntary retirements 
may not exceed 2% of the work force of the enterprise and must be approved 
by the assembly of the union or industry committee. 
In those enterprises which employ from one to fifteen workers, only one 
worker every two years may voluntarily retire.** The first worker may do so 
during the present year. In those enterprises which employ from sixteen to 
fifty workers, one worker per year may voluntarily retire. 
Workers who retire due to age or invalidity shall also have the right 
to this benefit. 
In case of the death of a worker, the indemnification for years of 
service shall be paid to the spouse, children or parents in that order. If 
there are no relatives, the enterprise and the union or committee shall decide 
together to whom the benefit should go. 
Where a discharged worker wins a suit for unjustified discharge before 
a competent tribunal in accordance with Law 16,1+55) the indemnification con-
tained herein shall not take effect. Only the court's disposition shall 
take effect. 
For the purposes of calculating years of service by the worker to the 
enterprise, any portion greater than six months shall he considered one 
year. 
The enterprises that have an indemnification system superior to that 
established in this resolution shall maintain the system agreed with their 
respective employees. 
Interruption of work is defined as a period of greater than six months 
in which the worker is separated from the enterprise. 
Finally, if a law is passed on indemnification for years of service 
that established benefits equal or superior to those contained herein, this 
system shall cease to have effect and all parties shall be subject to the 
law. 
*Law 16,1+55 limits the reasons for which workers may be discharged without 
indemnification. The limitations are so broad, however, as to be practically 
meaningless. This agreement cuts down to two the valid reasons, from thirteen 
that are listed in the law. 
**i.e., voluntarily retire and still have a right to indemnification. 
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Art. 12) Union Dues: Employers shall be required to check off from 
employees wages the following sums: 
a) E°2.70 checked off monthly, or E°32.1+0 once in a year, to be sent 
to the Central Unica de Traba.jadores. * 
b) E°30, checked off at one time, to be sent to the Federacion Nacional 
Textil.** This check-off shall be deposited in a savings association, bank 
or credit institution indicated by the Federacion Nacional Textil. 
c) There shall also be checked off the dues established in the. statutes 
and by-laws of the individual unions or agreed upon by the union assembly. 
For this effect, communication from the union to the enterprise shall be suf-
ficient, with the signature of the president and treasurer of the union and 
the names of the workers. 
These check-offs shall be deposited in the savings associations, banks 
or credit institutions indicated by the respective unions. 
If some worker does not want any of these sums checked off, the worker 
shall inform in writing the Inspectorate of Labor, and send a copy of the 
Federacion Nacional Textil or the respective union. 
Art. 13) Retroactive Pay: The retroactive increases of Wages and bene-
fits contained in this resolution shall be paid within thirty days of its 
publication. 
II. MAXIMUM WAGES* 
There are hereby established the following wages, which shall be valid 
for both workers and employers of the textile industry. 
1) Minimum Beginning Salary: The minimum beginning salary shall be 
paid for three months following the commencement of the respective work. At 
the end of this period the worker shall obtain the corresponding minimum sec-
tor wage or that which corresponds to the job being definitively performed 
by the worker. 
2) Payment of Lost Time: When the workers on piece rates do not have 
work to fill the hours of their shift due to causes beyond their control, 
the lost time shall be paid according to the minimum hourly wage established 
in this resolution. Where they are assigned to other work during such lost 
time, they shall be paid at either the rate of their normal work or the rate 
of the substitute work, whichever is higher. Where the substitute work is 
performed for thirty or more consecutive days, the worker may agree with the 
enterprise to remain permanently in the new function, but retaining the 
higher salary of the two. 
3) Percentage of General Increase: The percentage of general increase, 
valid for all the salaries in effect on December 31, 1971, shall be 39%, 
*i.e. , minimum wages. It says maximum but it means minimum. 
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dating from January 1, 1972. If upon application of this increase to the 
salaries in effect on December 31, 1971» wages higher than those signalled 
here as minimum for each sector, the higher wage shall remain in effect for 
the corresponding job. 
Inversely, if upon application of the increase to the. salaries in effect 
on December 31, 1971, wages lower than those signalled here should result, 
the minimum wages signalled here shall have effect, dating from April 10, 
1972. 
k) Percentage Increase for Empleados: The empleados who on December 
31, 1971, had a wage equal to or. less than three Scale A monthly sueldos 
vitales* for 1971 shall also receive an increase of 39$ dating from January 
1, 1972. 
The empleados who on December 31 -, 1971, had a wage superior to three 
sueldos vitales for 1971 shall receive that which they negotiate directly 
with their employers. 
The empleados whose specialties are covered in the minimum wages fixed 
below for each sector of the textile industry and elsewhere in-this resolu-
tion may obtain the minimum wages contained herein. 
5). Minimum Wages: There are hereby established the following minimum 
wages which shall be. in effect dating from April 10, 1972, for the entire 
private sector of the textile industry. For this purpose the textile indus-
try has been divided into the following branches: 
Knitting and Clothes-Making 
Cotton 
Wool and Spun Mixtures 
Socks and Hosiery 
Dyeing and Finishing 
Silks 
Rugs, Carpets and Tapestries 
Fiber Recovery 
(There follows a listing of all the jobs in each of the eight sectors-
over 150 jobs are listed, with salaries ranging from E°3.50 to E°8.90 per 
hour. The agreement concludes:) 
6) Piece Rates: Piece Rates shall be increased 39$ retroactive to 
January 1, 1972. 
*0ne of the various privileges enjoyed by empleados vis-a^vis obreros is 
that the former are paid in sueldos vitales. A sueldo vital is a legislatively 
fixed minimum wage for white collar workers, who are paid, for example, 1-1/2 
sueldos vitales, or 2 sueldos vitales, or whatever the case may be, per month. 
At the time of this agreement, one sueldo vital was about E°l,050. Empleados 
who earn more than three sueldos vitales are generally considered to occupy 
a position close to management, which is why they are excluded from coverage 
here. 
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7) Silk and Hosiery Piece Rates: Piece rates in the silk and hosiery 
sectors shall be determined by the Tripartite Commission before June 30, 
1972, and shall be in effect from July 1 to December 31, 1972. Between 
January 1 and June 30, the increase established in No. 6 above shall be in 
effect. 
(signed by the nine members of the 
Tripartite Commission) 
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NOTES 
1In J. Barria, El Movimiento Obrero en Chile, Santiago, 1971,p.44. 
No note here — mistakenly placed. 
^Barria, Breve Historia del Sindicalismo Chileno, Santiago, 1966,pp.35-36. 
^Programa de la Unidad Popular, Santiago, 1969. An English version is 
contained in the NACLA publication New Chile, New York, 1972,pp.130-142. 
^At election time in 1970, the CUT had about 600,000 member workers. Prom 
the results of the 1972 election of CUT officers, it can be estimated that 
about 400,000 members voted for Allende in 1970, almost one-fourth his 
total vote. 
1972 CUT Officer Election Results: 
Party 
3. 
aCommunist Party 
Socialist Party Christian Democratic Party 
JMAPU 
hRadical Party 
aMIR Popular Socialist Party 
Radical Left 
•uChristian Left 
Number of votes 
Revolutionary Communist Party 
Social Democrats 
Independents 
Anarchists 
Void Ballots 
Blank Ballots 
173,068 
148,140 
147,531 
25,983 
21,910 
10,192 
5,420 
3,572 
3,330 
3,216 
1,616 
1,599 
673 
8,348 
5,642 
% of votes 
30.9 
26.5 
26.3 
4.6 
3.9 
1.8 
1.0 
.6 • 
.6 
.6 
.3 
.2 
.1 
1.5 
1.0 
Member of UP coalition 
^Outside UP to the left; supported Allende in 1970 
6 For a study of the drafting and passage of the Chilean Labor Code, 
see J.O. Morris, Elites, Intellectuals and Consensus, Ithaca, N.Y.,1966. 
7 
Based on figures of the workforce size of manufacturing enterprises in 
IV Censo Nacional de Manufacturas, Santiago, 1971 (1967 figures), hereafter 
cited as Censo. This census surveyed manufacturing establishments that 
employed more than five workers. It covered a total of over 1^,000 
establishments employing about 365,000 workers. It is estimated, however, 
that another 300,000 persons work in the thousands of small-scale, often 
family-centered home manufacturing operations which lack the degree of 
impersonality of the employer-employee relationship that usually generates 
sindical organization. 
Q 
Patrick Pepe reports that: 
In general, the laws do encourage a high degree of union 
democracy. This is probably the only area in which the 
union is even unintentionally legitimized by the Code as 
112 
a political entity. Answers to several questions in my 
survey on the extent to which the workers consider that 
the majority was in actual control of union decisions 
indicate a high degree of at least felt democracy. Sixty 
percent of the obreros said that the majority of the members 
had "much" influence over the decisions of the union, 27% 
said that.it had "some," and only 6% said that it had "little" 
influence. Eighty-two percent thought that the majority de-
cided whether the union should go on strike or not, and 73% 
that the majority decided what contract demands should be 
made. 
— "Power and Ideology," Chapter IV of draft of 
Ph.D. thesis, loaned by author. • 
°Memoria Anual de la Direccion del Trabajo, 1970. 
This assertion is based mainly on the statements of union officials, 
Ministry of Labor officials and labor relations scholars during inter-
views of June-December, 1972. Some scanty data support it: in 1968, 
tne average wage increase in union agreements was 25.8% while the 
previous year's inflation had been 21.9%. In 1970, the gap was 34.5%-
29.3%. Source:' Memoria Anual de la Direccion del Trabajo, 1968 and 
1970, and Indice de Precios aT~Consumidor, published monthly by the 
Institute MacionaT-de Estadisticas. 
In a study of Chilean wage structures, Peter Gregory attributed the 
narrow intra-firm differentials to the trade union movement's "strong 
egalitarian tradition and primary sense of responsibility for the 
workers at the bottom of the income structure." Industrial Wages in 
Chile, Ithaca, New York, 1967,p.89. 
12 
Based on discussions with union officers and employers, June-December,1972, 
13 
^Memoria Anual de la Direccion del Trabajo, 1970. Figures for other years 
are the following:
 I l l e g a l s t r i k e s I e g a l s t r i k e s T o t a l s t r i k e a 
1967 861 253 1,114 
1968 901 223 1,124 
1969 771* 206* 977* 
1970 1,601 218 1,819 
*Private Sector Only. 
14 
15 
J. Barria, Historia de la CUT, Santiago, 1971,p.46. 
Ibid.,pp.121-122. 
J. Barria, Las Relaciones Colectivas del Trabajo en Chile, Santiago. 
1967, pp. 15-16: --: " 
17 
V. Valdes, "Las Relaciones del Trabajo en la Industria del Cobre," 
Santiago (INSORA unpublished manuscript), 1967. 
18 
See Barria, Las Relaciones del Trabajo en la Industria de Cuero y 
Calzado. Santiago, 1967. " 
113 
•^See valdes, op.cit., for an extended discussion of these reforms. 
20Article 7 of Law 17.074 of December 16, 1968, published in Diario 
Oficial, December 31, 1968. 
21See Barria, Historia de la CUT,pp.122-128; 134-135 for an account of 
these measures. 
2
 The word, as well as the analysis in general, is from personal inter-
views with lawyers of the Labor Ministry under the j?rei government. 
25Executive Decree 825 of December 16, 1970. 
24
"See Table p.49. 
25Interviews with Ministry of Labor officials, June-December, 1972. 
26See table p.26. 
'See ibid., and Memoria Anual de la Direccion del Trabajo, 1971 and 1972. 
28See table p.26. 
"The Opposition-controlled Congress passed a law forbidding intervention 
or requisition without an express act of Congress. President Allende 
vetoed the law. The Opposition lacks the required two-thirds majority 
to override a presidential veto. It proposed a constitutional reform 
that would permit a simple majority to override a veto, but at the 
same time lacks the necessary two-thirds to reform the Constitution. 
The then-Minister of the Economy, Pedro Vuskovic, declared that "the 
companies that have passed into the hands of the workers will stay in 
their hands with or without a constitutional reform." Cited in "Partici-
pacion Es Poder," pamphlet of the Ministry of the Economy, Santiago, 1972. 
30 
See, for example, note 34. 
•2.\ 
See almost any edition of El Siglo, the Communist Party newspaper, or 
Principios, the Party's theoretical organ, for a Commu—nist critique of 
the ultra-left. A good example is J. Texier, "La Transicion al Socialismo 
y el Ultraizquierda," Principios, No.145, May-June,1972,p.51. 
52Listed in El Mercuric, June 22,1972,p.20. 
53Censo, pp.34; 52-53. 
34-
In some of these firms, workers struck precisely for the purpose of 
having their plant intervened; e.g: "The situaxion had become so im-
possible for us that we decided to go on strike to force the government 
to intervene the company." 
— a textile worker of an intervened firm, after describing 
how his former employer had maintained a goon squad to handle militant 
unionists. Quoted in Panorama Economico, September, 1972,p.27. 
55See pp.9-10. 
llU 
•' ^  Targets for nationalization in the UP program were: 
1. the large raining companies of copper, nitrate, iodine, iron 
' and coal; 
2. the country's financial system, especially private banks and 
insurance companies; 
3. foreign trade; 
,,, 4. the great distribution enterprises and monopolies; 
- 5. the strategic industrial monop'olies; 
6. in general, all those activities which determine the country's 
economic and social development . . . 
^For those curious about the likelihood of small businessmen being 
amenable to such a coalition, the results of a 1967 survey of small 
businessmen (firms of less than 50 workers) are interesting. 79% thought 
the government should plan the economy to some degree. 36% thought it 
should plan xhe entire economy. It is doubtful, however, that they had 
in mind the UP as the government doing the planning, or that such planning 
would be part of a socialist program. Only 28% thought the CUT should be 
involved in planning the economy. 88% agreed with the statement: "The 
^government is not a good manager." 
J.A. Lobos T., "El Pequeno Empresario y Tres Factores Socio-economicos," 
Santiago, University of Chile, pp.144,156,185. 
^ Erratum 
'"There was also an organization of small textile artesans, but this 
grouped the home manufacturing sector of the industry rather than firms 
cnaracterized by an employer-employee relationship. 
40. 
Bargaining agreement of April 7, 1971, in Directorate of Labor archives 
See pp.9-10. 41 
42 
That is, fifteen hundred firms with an employer-employee relationship. 
There are another 1,000-1,560family-style operations, mostly small 
clothesmakers. 
Erratum 43 
See Tom E. Davis, "Dualism, Stagnation, and Inequality: The Impact 
of Pension Legislation in the Chilean Labor Market," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, April, 1964,p.380. 
45 
Erratum 
See Thomas Weiskopf, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment in the Modern 
World," in The Capitalist System, New Jersey, Pren-cice-Hall, 1972,p.442. 
47 
United Nations, CEPAL, Productividad en la Industria Textil Latino-
Americana, 1962. 
See Heleen F.P. Ietswaart, unpublished (as yet) J.S.D. thesis on 
Chilean labor justice, Yale Law School Program in Law and Moderniza-
tion, 1973. 
115 
^Government jobs and lines of autnority are distributed according to 
'•'.quotas for each of the UP parties. Decisions taken at party committee 
.meetings are at least as important as collective UP policy decisions. 
}-5®k passage from Principios, the theoretical organ of the Communist 
"party, should illustrate its line: 
. . . A policy of senseless exproporiations, of indiscriminate 
interventions of non-monopolistic companies, of indifference 
in the face of lack of labor discipline ana indifference to 
considerations of productivity, and of pushing opportunistic 
wage demands, is to give ammunition to the enemy. 
— Principios, May-June, 1972,p.13. 
'-5 Erratum . 
" B a s e d on i n t e r v i e w s wi th employer r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the T r i p a r t i t e 
Commission and l e g a l s t a f f members of the I n s t i t u t e T e x t i l , J u n e -
December, 1972. 
5 3 I b i d . 
-^Paraphrase of remarks by Commission members in interviews, June-December, 
1972. 
55 See table p.44,45. 
56UADE, Informe T e x t i l , 1968, and Censo, pp.52-53 
5 7See p . 1 5 . 
58Censo,p.52 
This firm's agreement followed a bitter strike, complete with toma. 
In addition to the big wage hike, one of the elauses contained the 
employer's recognition that no damage had been done to the plant or 
machinery during the takeover, and his agreement to abandon legal 
actions begun against the employees for the toma. 
60 
Both clauses are from collective agreements in the archives of the 
Directorate of Labor. 
c-, in interview 
62 
63 
Statement of FEMTEX official,, September, 1972. 
Statement of Instituto Textil official in interview, October, 1972. 
Records of AMPICH. 
64See p.29. 
65 
Interview with government representative on Printing Indu—stry 
tripartite Commission. 
66, 
67 
Interviews with Commission, November, 1972. 
See generally the Opposition newspapers of September and October, 1972. 
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68See table p.49. 
^Membership in agricultural unions nearly doubled in 1971 alone, from 
114,000 to 215,000 workers. Source: Memorla Anual de la Direccion del 
rprabajo, 1971. 
7°CUT representatives have been appointed to decision-making bodies of 
7 all the ministries and state planning authorities. 
f^ In 1971 there were 162 new obrero unions and 310 new erapleado unions. 
For 1972, the totals were approximately 200 and 600. 
72I n the Chuquicamata copper mine, for example, there were approximately 
/ 70 partial strikes in 1972 in violation of the collective agreement by 
various groups of skilled workers, including skilled obreroa, seeking 
special benefits for their particular group. 
73>For
 a n elaboration of the Christian Democratic proposals, see El Mercurio 
editorials of June 6, 16 and 27; July 5, 13 and 31; August 8 and 9. For 
UP criticisms of the proposals, see remarks in Panorama Economico, Septem-
ber, 1972, pp.24-27. 
74. 
"'^Erratum. 
^For further discussion of the legal basis of tne Area Social, see 
Oscar Aramayo, Regimen Legal del Comercio Interno Chileno, Santiago, 
1964; Raul Espinoza, "La Requisieion de los Monopolies Textiles y un 
Fallo de la Corte Suprema," and Eduardo wovoa, "El Dificil Camino de 
la Legalidad," both in Revista de la Universidad Tecnica del Estado, 
April, 1972,pp.7 & 89; and E. Wovoa, "Vias Legales para Avanzar hacia 
el Soeialismo," Revista de Rerecho Economico, October'70-March171,p.27. 
76La Nacion, June 26, 1972. 
77 
'Based on survey of bargaining agreements of textile firms in the 
Area Social, in archives of the Directorate of Labor. 
78La Nacion, July 26, 1972. 
79 
A. Millas, "La Clase Obrera en las Condiciones del Gobiemo Popular," 
Principles, May-June, 1972, pp.16; 23-24. 
Dm 
One Communist union president told me he would much rather be a union 
officer in the private sector, where everything is clear-cut? the boss 
is the boss and not a party comrade. 
81 
On tne juridical base, see note 75. There is a major campaign by the 
UP and the unions to make the law bend to the force of events. Workers 
of the Area Social are nearly unanimous, despite their political affili-
ation, in promising never to return the intervened firms to their former 
owners. What happens when a new government -- as Chile is likely to have 
in 1976 — is faced with a court order to return the firms to their former 
owners, on one hand, and with thousands of workers who oppose sueh a move 
on the other hand, will be a test of the UP's long-range success in 
changing Chilean society. 
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0
 Erratum 
8
^See, for example, round-table discussions in Punto Pinal, OctoDer 10, 
1972,(Document©), and Panorama Econoraico, September, 1972,p.16. 
84See Ibid. 
1
 "-'Erratum. 
86In "Participacion Es Poder," published by Coraite Textil CORPO, Santiago, 
1972. 
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